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DEAD MEN TELL TALES: THIRTY TIMES THREE YEARS
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AFTER HILLMON
DOUGLAS

D. MCFARLANDt

The author traces the development of the Hillmon doctrine, an
exception to the hearsay rule that permits admissibility of a declaration of intent to do a future act as circumstantialevidence that
the act was done. Arguing that the doctrine has been expandedoften by judicial inadvertence-to encompass acts of third parties
and past acts, the author concludes that the courts should set
about harnessing the exception before it abolishes the hearsay rule
itself
I.

INTRODUCTION

was conceived from "dense darkness" 2
and born in a dictum. Little analytical light has illuminated
the nine decades of its growth. In its purest form, this exception
to the hearsay rule allows into evidence a declaration of a present
state of mind to do an act in the future-an intention-as circumstantial evidence that the act was accomplished.3 At the time
Hillmon was decided, this "extraordinary" 4 doctrine marked a

THE Hillmon doctrine'

t Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. B.A., Macalester
College, 1968; J.D., New York University, 1971; Ph.D., University of Minnesota,
1983. During 1984-85, the author is on leave serving as ajudicial Fellow at the
Supreme Court of the United States.
1. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
2. Justice Horace Gray wrote the Hillmon opinion. His law clerk, Ezra Ripley Thayer, is attributed with this description of Justice Gray's analysis of the
case. See Maguire, The Hillmon Case-Thirty-three Years After, 38 HARv. L. REV. 709,
711-12 (1925).
3. See generally 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 442
(1980); 6J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1725 (Chadbourn rev. 1976); Seidelson, The

State of Mind Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 13 DuQ. L. REV. 251 (1974).
4. United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 376 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1099 (1977). Accord People v. Lauro, 91 Misc. 2d 706, 398 N.Y.S.2d
503 (Sup. Ct. 1977). For a discussion of Pheaster, see infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
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"vigorous leap" 5 from prior cases. It has since been shaped by
the judicial process; subsequent cases have extended its reach
whilejumping over logical analytical stopping places, often "inadvertently." 6 In its maturity, the Hillmon doctrine has become to
some "elusive" and "pernicious, ' 7 to others "dangerous" and
"promiscuous,"" and to many in difficult cases, "unintelligible." 9
This article argues that the Hilimon Court was presented with
a classic choice between doing justice in the individual case and
establishing a workable rule of law. The Court chose the former
course by creating a new exception to the hearsay rule crafted
especially for the unique factual circumstances of the case. Yet
the Court's novel approach did not go unnoticed; the new exception was launched into the stream of the judicial process and became a point of departure by which courts expanded the
exception in the guise of applying it. Some courts expanded the
exception knowingly, but others did so accidentally, for to some
judges, "[t]he rule itself is more important than the theory on
0
which it is founded."'
As a hearsay exception grows, less of the hearsay rule remains. Consequently, the Hillmon doctrine has grown at the expense of the hearsay rule. An examination of the cases shaping
the contours of the doctrine reveals that the tide is washing ever
higher on the rule. Commentators have warned that the Hillmon
doctrine may engulf the hearsay rule." To some extent, this
trend parallels the general loosening of all exclusionary rules of
5. Maguire, supra note 2, at 714.
6. Payne, The Hillmon Case-An Old Problem Revisited, 41 VA. L. REV. 1011,
1033 (1955).
7. Seidelson, supra note 3, at 251.
8. United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840, 845 (4th Cir.) (Widener, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978).
9. Maguire, supra note 2, at 731.
10. State v. Perelli, 125 Conn. 321, 325, 5 A.2d 705, 707 (1939).
11. In the first critical analysis of the Hillmon doctrine, the author warned,
"to follow the Hillmon case consistently leads to the abolition of the hearsay
rule." Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 HARV. L. REV. 146, 157
(1912). Several recent commentators have remarked on the same possibility.
See Rice, The State of Mind Exception to the Hearsay Rule: A Response to the " 'Secondary' Relevance," 14 Duq.. L. REV. 219, 230 (1976); Seidelson, supra note 3. Cf
Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 970 (1974). To the extent
that the Hillmon doctrine allows a declaration of a present state of mind to include a memory, the hearsay rule evaporates because a memory will always in a
sense be a present state of mind. If declarations of intention to undertake future
actions are admitted, then logical consistency may require the admission of declarations of present memories of past actions undertaken. See infra notes 59-61
and accompanying text.
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evidence. 12 Of all the exceptions to the hearsay rule, however,
the state of mind exception has the greatest potential for turning
the rule inside out. If this is what the courts desire, so be it. The
problem is that this assault on the rule appears to be happening
by default, and not by carefully reasoned design.
The time has probably passed for a counterattack aimed at
eliminating the Hilimon exception. No court has rejected the doctrine outright, and it has been stamped with approval by Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(3).' 3 Yet, before courts extend the Hilimon
doctrine further, its analytical basis and its step-by-step expansion
should be explored. Then courts can decide, with full awareness
of the consequences, whether to continue this relentless surge
over the ramparts of the hearsay rule.
II.

THE HILLMON DECISION

A.

Facts of the Case

Few cases in American judicial history present more intriguing facts than Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon.14 Nearly every
opinion or commentary which discusses the case repeats the fac15
tual situation at length and with editorial flourishes.
The Hillmon story involves two men, John W. Hillmon and
Frederick Adolph Walters. One of them ended up dead at
Crooked Creek, Kansas, on March 17, 1879. The other disappeared, never to be heard from again.
The relevant events began some months earlier. 16 In Octo12. See generally Evans, Article Eight of the FederalRules of Evidence: The Hearsay
Rule, 8 VAL. L. REV. 261 (1974); McCormick, The Borderlandof Hearsay, 39 YALE
L.J. 489 (1930); Younger, Reflections on the Rule Against Hearsay, 32 S.C.L. REV.
281 (1980). See also Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking of the FourthAmendment,
21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984).

13. See FED. R. EvID. 803(3). Rule 803(3) provides for the following exception to the hearsay rule:
Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain and
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to
prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
Id.
14. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 377 (9th Cir. 1976); 4
D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 3, § 442, at 545-47, 558-59; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE

803(3)[041, at 803-116 (1982).

16. The statement of facts is based in part on the Court's opinion and in
larger part on the 40 page evidence summary and commentary in J. WIGMORE,
THE PRINCIPLES OFJUDICIAL PROOF 856-96 (1913).

One must take some care in
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ber, 1878, Hillmon was married. Then, in the late fall of 1878,
Hillmon, accompanied by friend Levi Baldwin, sought out life insurance purchases on four separate occasions. The four policies,
each obtained in a separate transaction from three different companies, had combined face values of $25,000. The annual premiums totalled about $600. Hillmon had always been a poor man,
and at the time had no regular gainful employment. He paid the
first semiannual premiums part in cash and part by a note. His
friend Baldwin vouched for Hillmon's character. Baldwin was reputed to be a wealthy cattleman, but later was found to be
bankrupt.
Accompanied by another friend, John Brown, Hillmon went
forth from Lawrence, Kansas, on March 5, 1879, to search for
suitable ranch land to purchase.' 7 What he intended to use for
purchase money was not placed into the record. The search
ended at Crooked Creek, Kansas, in the evening hours of March
17, 1879, when Brown allegedly accidentally shot Hillmon in the
head. A body was soon buried at Medicine Lodge, although Sallie
Hillmon, the widow, remained in Lawrence. She claimed the insurance money.
Agents for the insurance companies, stung by three recent
fraudulent claims, raced to Medicine Lodge to investigate. They
demanded the body be exhumed, and it was. The body was carried back to Lawrence where the coroner held an inquest. The
jury found that the body was an unidentified man. The insurance
companies refused the widow's claim for the insurance proceeds.
The widow sued. The following summer, by investigation and
chance, the insurance companies discovered that Frederick Walters had also disappeared in March, 1879, after leaving his family
and his betrothed in Fort Madison, Iowa. Pictures of the body
buried at Medicine Lodge were exhibited to Walters' relatives and
they identified the body as Walters'.
accepting the latter source, for it is taken almost completely from the report of
Charles Gleed to the Kansas Insurance Commissioner. Gleed represented one
of the defendant insurance companies in the case. Nevertheless, he did separate
facts in evidence from his comments, and the facts summarized here are based
on the evidence admitted at trial.
An extended journalistic account of the events of the case, complete with a
picture of the corpse, is available in MacCracken, The Case of the Anonymous Corpse,
AM. HERITAGE, June 1968, at 50.
17. Hillmon and Brown had apparently made an earlier trip in late December, 1878. The insurance companies suggested that this first trip had been a
failure because Brown and Hillmon's hopes of finding a frozen body they could
pass off as Hillmon's went unrealized. Brown signed an affidavit to this effect. J.
WIGMORE,

supra note 16, at 871.
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The contending sides were thus set for litigation. The plaintiff widow alleged that Hillmon and Brown had travelled together
in their search for ranch land to Crooked Creek where the accidental shooting occurred. The three defendant insurance companies alleged that Hillmon and Brown had lured Walters into
travelling with them with promises of employment. In fact, they
planned to kill Walters and use his body to collect the insurance
proceeds. The defendant insurance companies alleged that
Hillmon had shot Walters, and tried to place the head of the body
into the campfire to obliterate its identity. Hillmon, they said, was
hiding out waiting for his share of the illegal gains.
Six trials resulted in no final decision. Extensive evidence,
giving meaning to the rule against cumulative evidence, was
presented by both the widow1 8 and the insurance companies.' 9
18. Wigmore presents the plaintiffis evidence as follows, Sallie Hillmon,
John Brown, Levi Baldwin, and four other witnesses swore the body was
Hillmon's. Five other witnesses said that the body was that of the man they had
seen with Brown in a wagon going west. Two other inferences favored the plaintiff. Undisputed evidence was that the corpse measured 5' 11 5/8" and had a
vaccination mark on the arm. Although the defendants maintained that Hillmon
was 5' 9" tall, the defendants' doctor had written 5 feet 11 inches on Hillmon's
application for insurance. Only after the litigation arose did the doctor state
that he had remeasured Hillmon, but had failed to change the application. The
defendants' doctors had cut the vaccination mark from the arm of the body for
examination, but had never returned the removed portion. J. WIGMORE, supra
note 16, at 862-63.
19. Wigmore presents the defendants' evidence as follows. Primary reliance was placed on the characteristics of the body. At the time of his "death,"
Hillmon was 34 years old. Four doctors testified that the body was that of a man
about 25 years old, which was Walters' age. The body was further described as
having the following characteristics: height, 5' 11 5/8"; teeth, large, white, and
perfect; face, long and thin; lips, parted; jaws, strong and square; scars, none on
head or hands. Hillmon's army enlistment and discharge papers listed him at 5'
8". Eleven witnesses, including Hillmon's sister and other intimate friends, testified that his teeth were poor and he was missing an upper left incisor. Other
witnesses testified that Hillmon had an egg-shaped face which tapered to the
jaw, closed lips, and scars on the back of his head and on his hand. The body
was clad in Hillmon's clothes, but the clothes appeared slightly too small for it.
Twenty-two witnesses swore that the photograph of the corpse was that of Frederick Walters. One witness said he had seen Hillmon in Colorado, although this
testimony is described as "not very satisfactory." J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, at
868.
The defendants produced additional evidence with dramatic impact. Before
the body was returned to Lawrence from Medicine Lodge investigators attempted to obtain a description of her husband from Mrs. Hillmon. She responded only that he had more hair than one of the investigators, a Mr. Green.
Since Mr. Green was bald, the defendants did not consider this an adequate
response. For some weeks after the shooting, Mrs. Hillmon stayed at the home
of a lawyer closely associated with the insurance companies. While in the lawyer's home, Sallie Hillmon signed a complete release of all claims. The release
was later revoked because a creditor would not surrender the policies. In addition, John Brown, the sole eyewitness to the shooting, signed an affidavit to the
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The trials focused on the single fact question of whose body had
been found. The first two resulted in split decisions. At the third
trial, the plaintiff widow received the verdict.
The only significant difference in the evidence presented to
the third jury was the exclusion of two letters written by Walters.
One was to his sister. She could not find the original, but
remembered that her brother had written, "I expect to leave
20
Wichita on or about March the 5th, with a certain Mr. Hillmon."
The other letter was sent to Walters' fiancee. Walters wrote,
I will stay here until the fore part of next week, and then
will leave here to see a part of the country that I never
expected to see when I left home, as I am going with a
man by the name of Hillmon, who intends to start a
sheep ranch, and as he promised me more wages than I
could make at anything else I concluded to take
it

. . . . 21

The letters were offered to support an inference that Walters had
acted on his intention and gone with Hillmon; therefore, the body
was his. At the third trial, the trial judge excluded evidence of the
letters as hearsay.
The defendants sued out writs of error to the United States
effect that he, Hillmon, and Baldwin had conspired to defraud the insurance
companies. He stated that he and Hillmon had befriended a drifter, called
"Joe" for the purpose of presenting his body as Hillmon's. Pains had been
taken that no one should see more than two people in the wagon on the road to
the crime scene. At Crooked Creek, Hillmon killed the victim. Brown had
signed the affidavit after the coroner's inquest jury implicated him feloniously in
the murder. Only then did he name Hillmon as the murderer. Brown offered to
trade this testimony in exchange for immunity from prosecution. When the deal
fell through, he returned to his original story. At the trials, Brown testified on
Mrs. Hillmon's behalf that he had accidentally shot Hillmon. Id. at 862-76.
Three other tantalizing items of evidence were admitted at trials two and
three, although they were excluded in trial six, resulting in another Supreme
Court reversal. See infra note 29. These three items were statements by the alleged coconspirator, Levi Baldwin. Before the shooting, Baldwin had asked the
representative of a bank to delay foreclosure proceedings on his farm, saying
that he would soon receive $10,000 of Hillmon's insurance money. In the fall of
1878, Baldwin had questioned his doctor about the decomposition of bodies,
and asked further if it "would not be a good scheme to get a good insurance on
your life and go down south and get the body of some Greaser and pawn it off as
your body and get the money[?]" Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon,
188 U.S. 208, 216 (1903). Finally, on March 10, 1879, Baldwin had said that he
had a "brogue" under way with Hillmon. Id. at 217. Brogue is a Scottish word
for trick or prank. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 281
(unabr. ed. 1976).
20. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 288 (1892).
21. Id.
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Supreme Court. Among nearly one hundred assignments of error were complaints of the consolidation of their cases, of the failure to allow each defendant its own peremptory challenges, and
of the exclusion of the letters.
Members of the Court voted to reverse on general principles,
leaving Justice Horace Gray to his own ingenuity to work out the
theory of reversal. 22 Gray, writing for the Court, first approved
the consolidation, but found reversible error because the trial
court had not allowed each defendant the three peremptory challenges guaranteed by statute. 2 3 He then pressed forward to consider the evidence question. The defendants had argued for
admission of the letters as business records, but this argument
was summarily rejected. 2 4 With help from a nationally recognized
evidence scholar, 25 Justice Gray devised a theory of admissibility.
He decided on a new exception to the hearsay rule for a declaration of present intention to do an act, such declaration being circumstantial evidence that the intention was carried out and the
act accomplished. 2 6 The pertinent portion of the opinion reads
as follows:
When the intention to be proved is important only as
qualifying an act, its connection with that act must be
shown, in order to warrant the admission of declarations
of the intention. But whenever the intention is of itself a
distinct and material fact in a chain of circumstances, it
may be proved by contemporaneous oral or written declarations of the party.
The existence of a particular intention in a certain
person at a certain time being a material fact to be
proved, evidence that he expressed that intention at that
time is as direct evidence of the fact, as his own testimony that he then had that intention would be ....
The letters in question were competent . . . as evi22. Maguire, supra note 2, at 711 (quoting Dean Ezra Thayer's working
notes on evidence).
23. Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 293-94.
24. Id. at 295. See Maguire, supra note 2, at 711.
25. The assistance came from Professor James Bradley Thayer. Maguire,
supra note 2, at 711-12.
26. 145 U.S. at 295-96. This is the rule of law for which the case is traditionally cited. The holding could be read more narrowly: "[A] statement indicating the intent of the declarant to embark upon a trip may be received as
evidence that he did in fact embark upon that trip sometime later, at least where
he is unavailable to testify at trial." 4 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 3,
§ 442, at 546.
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dence that, shortly before the time when other evidence
tended to show that he went away, he had the intention
of going, and of going with Hillmon, which made it more
probable both that he did go and that he went with
Hillmon, than if there had been no proof of such
27
intention.
The case was remanded to the trial court.
A fourth, a fifth, and a sixth trial were required before, finally, another jury returned a verdict. 28 This verdict, again for
the plaintiff, was also appealed to the Supreme Court, and another reversal was ordered. 29 Apparently the parties finally set30
tled the case.
B. Analysis of the Hillmon Opinion
Justice Gray's opinion had found reversible error in the failure of the trial court to grant each of the three defendants its own
peremptory challenges. This error, said the Court, "entitles them
to a new trial."'' a The case was decided.
Not satisfied with grounding the decision solely on the question of the number of challenges, Justice Gray determined to offer
the Court's "opinion" on another issue: "There is, however, one
question of evidence so important, so fully argued at the bar, and
so likely to arise upon another trial, that it is proper to express an
opinion upon it."32 Such an introduction would seem a clear signal that the ensuing discussion is a dictum, albeit an extended
dictum. Yet, even if the evidentiary discussion were viewed as an
27. 145 U.S. at 295-96.
28. The Hillmon litigation was exceptionally protracted, even by today's
standards. The first trial, in 1882, lasted shortly more than two weeks. Thisjury
and the jury which heard the case in June, 1885 were unable to reach a verdict.

Finally, in 1888, a verdict was reached (for the plaintiff) after a three week trial.
The fourth trial consumed portions of three months in 1895. The jury was unable to reach a verdict. The fifth trial, lasting over three weeks in 1896, resulted
in another hung jury. The sixth trial, taking four weeks in 1899, resulted in
another verdict for plaintiff. J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, at 856 n.2.

29. The result was affirmed by the circuit court, but reversed by the
Supreme Court. See HiUmon, 107 F.2d 834 (8th Cir. 1901), rev'd, 188 U.S. 208
(1903).

The reversal came on a seven to two vote. One of the two dissenting

justices was Justice David Brewer, who had been the trial judge at the second
trial.
30. J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, at 856-57 n.2.
31. HiUmon, 145 U.S. at 293-94. After consolidating the lawsuits, the trial
court had granted only one set of three challenges to the defendants as a group,
instead of the three to which each was entitled by statute. Id.
32. Id. at 294.
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alternate holding,3 3 such an interpretation hardly places it at the
level of the rule of the case which is so commonly taken from the
opinion.
Leaving aside the holding issue, we find that the Court's discussion of the evidence question condenses to two sentences:
[W]henever the intention is of itself a distinct and material fact in a chain of circumstances, it may be proved by
contemporaneous oral or written declarations of the
party.
The existence of a particular intention in a certain
person at a certain time being a material fact to be
proved, evidence that he expressed that intention. . . is
• . . direct evidence of the fact . . .4
First, the Court indicates that the intention may be proved by the
declaration of a party. This is careless writing, for the Court apparently means declarant. Indeed, the discussion would be senseless otherwise, for Walters the declarant is neither a party nor a
predecessor in interest to a party.
What is left is the Court's requirement that the intention be a
"material fact." The Court reasons that since the intention of
Walters forms a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence leading to the ultimate conclusion that Hillmon is not dead, the intention is a material fact. Thus, Walters' declarations cannot be
offered as "proof that he actually went away from Wichita," but
instead as evidence that Walters "had the intention of going, ...
which made it more probable that he did go and that he went with
35
Hillmon."
At first glance, the Court's reasoning seems logically valid. If
the intention is a material fact, then it may be proved by a declaration of intent. The existence of the intention is a material fact.
Therefore, it may be proved by the declaration of intent. That is
the elementary form of logical argument known as modus ponens
followed in the crux of the opinion on this issue.
The fallacy in the Court's reasoning becomes apparent when
one questions the minor premise. Although the opinion identi33. The discussion devoted to the hearsay question does consume more
than two-thirds of the opinion, and the closing language includes this statement:
"[Flor the exclusion of these letters, as well as for the undue restriction of the
defendants' challenges, the verdicts must be set aside, and a new trial had." Id.
at 300. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 3, § 442, at 559 n.20.
34. 145 U.S. at 295.
35. Id. at 296.
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fies Walters' intention as a material fact, at no point does the
Court support this bald assertion. Was the intention a material
fact? Certainly the intention was not one of the elements of the
plaintiff's or defendants' cases, which is the normal use of the
concept. 3 6 The elements of the plaintiff's case were 1) offer and
acceptance of the insurance contract, 2) valid consideration, and
3) death of the insured. The defense of the insurance companies
was a negative one: they denied the death of the insured. Accordingly, the relevant material fact seems to be the death of
Hillmon. The intention of Walters has probative value only as it
tends to prove that Walters went with Hillmon. The intention is
not itself a material fact because it is only circumstantial evidence
that the body was Walters' and not Hillmon's.
Furthermore, Walters' intent is several steps removed from
the material fact of Hillmon's death. Assuming the declarations
prove that Walters intended to go on a trip with Hillmon, we first
infer that Walters did go. From this we infer that Walters was
present at Crooked Creek. From this we infer that Walters was
shot. From this we infer that the body is not Hillmon's. From
this we infer that Hillmon is not dead. In all, there are five levels
of inference. Thus, contrary to the Court's assertion, Walters' intention seems to be little more than relevant evidence on the material fact of Hillmon's death.3 7 As discussed below, this
diminution in status significantly reduces the necessity for receiving Walters' statements into evidence.
The evidentiary necessity of the fact situation in Hilimon must
be contrasted with cases where the declarant's mental state is
clearly a material fact. 38 In these cases, mental state is "an opera36. The pleading and practice definition of "material fact" is "[o]ne which
is essential to the case, defense, application, etc., and without which it could not
be supported." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 881 (5th ed. 1979). By no stretch of
the imagination could the intention of Walters to go on a trip be said to be
essential to a life insurance claim on the life of another man. Neither was the
intention essential to the defense. See supra notes 18-19 and infra note 43.
37. A critic might object to this argument by pointing out that the affirmative defense of fraud had likely been asserted by the defendants. In fact, should
one assume fraud was at issue, the intention is no closer to being a material fact.
If the intention were offered as some proof of fraud, additional inferential steps
would be required. From the fact that Hillmon is not dead, we infer that
Hillmon and Brown killed Walters. From this we infer that the killing was an act
furthering the conspiracy to defraud the insurance companies. Again we reach
the material fact. For the Court to say that the intention itself was a material fact
cannot be supported.
38. For a general discussion of the cases where mental state is in issue, see
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 294 (3d ed. 1984); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 15, T 803(3)[03], at 803-11 to -115.
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tive fact upon which a cause of action or defense depends." 39 For
instance, in a prosecution for kidnapping, the victim's state of
mind is a crucial issue if the defendant alleges consent. 40 In these
situations where mental state is directly an issue, a declaration of
that mental state is strong, needed evidence. Although state of
mind can be proved by circumstantial evidence, there is little
doubt that such evidence is inferior to the contemporaneous declarations of the only person who can know his state of mind-the
41
declarant.
If mental state is not directly an issue, as was the case in
Hillmon, the probative value of a declaration of mental state is significantly diminished. As circumstantial evidence, it becomes further removed from the material fact. Also, the declaration will be
fraught with the usual hearsay dangers, but will lack the counterbalancing force of being the best possible evidence. In the abstract, there is little need for state of mind evidence in these cases
because other, more direct evidence of the fact is likely to be
available. Particular cases may require state of mind evidence,
but hearsay exceptions are generally considered and developed in
the abstract. 4 2 Even so, the need for state of mind evidence in
Hillmon is questionable, given the mass of evidence already avail43
able to both adversaries.
Apparently, the Court's requirement that the intention be a
"material fact" derived from the primary precedent on which it
relied, Travelers Insurance Co. v. Mosley. 4 4

Yet that case involved

39. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 38, § 294, at 843.
40. See United States v. Green, 680 F.2d 520 (7th Cir.) (contemporaneous
statements of a victim are admissible to prove lack of consent in a kidnapping
prosecution), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1072 (1982).
41. See 6J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1714, at 90.
42. "Where the need is peculiar to a given case, because of the accidental
lack of other evidence, the courts in general have been unwilling to create new
exceptions. This is the price we must pay for the hearsay rule if it is to remain
workable at all." Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, 1 U. CHI. L. REV.
394, 418 (1934). Cf 5J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, §§ 1420-1422, at 251-54.
43. See supra notes 18-19. The mistake of thinking that Hilimon involved a
situation that greatly necessitated admission of the evidence has been made by
both courts and commentators. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 437 F. Supp.
262, 266 (D. Md. 1977), afd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 591 F.2d 1347
(4th Cir.), aff'd, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961
(1980); Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-State of
Mind to Prove an Act, 38 YALE LJ. 283 (1929).
44. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397 (1869). In this case, Mosley purchased a $5000
life insurance policy, naming his wife as beneficiary. Id. at 397. The benefits
were to be paid only if the insured died within three months of events involving
"some outward and visible means, of which proof satisfactory to the company
can be furnished." Id. Following the insured's death, his wife claimed the pro-
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declarations of bodily pain, a mental state in issue. The Mosley
Court stated, "Wherever the bodily or mental feelings of an individual are material to be proved, the usual expression of such
feelings are original and competent evidence." 4 5 Be that as it
may for situations where bodily or mental feelings bear on the
material issue of pain and suffering damages, this theory simply
does not apply where the mental state-intention-is relevant
only as it tends to provide an inference that an act took place.
The weakness ofJustice Gray's use of precedent in Hilimon is
that no distinction is made between state of mind actually in issue
and state of mind relevant only insofar as it provides an inference
of an act. Of the nineteen cases cited in the Hilimon opinion to
support admission of the letters, all but two involved state of
mind directly in issue. The cases cited by the Court involved declarations of a bankrupt on the issue of intent to defraud creditors,
declarations of a servant on the issue of his reasons for leaving
service, declarations of a person on the issue of intent to take passage on a train, declarations of a spouse on the issue of her affection in an action for criminal conversion, and declarations of a
testator on the issues of fraud and undue influence when a will
was questioned. 4 6 Of the remaining two cases, one was a will case
in which the proponent of the evidence attempted to offer the
testator's stated intention to prove the contents of a missing
will. 47 This situation was not state of mind in issue, but was
something very close.
The only precedent actually on point was a New Jersey case,
Hunter v. State.48 That case was a murder prosecution. The victim
had declared his intention of journeying to Camden with the defendant. After an extended factual analysis, the New Jersey court
admitted the declaration as part of the res gestae of the act of going, which was in turn regarded as part of the res gestae of the
ceeds, asserting that the insured's death was caused by an accidental fall down a
flight of stairs in the previous three months. Id. at 398. The insurance company
denied liability, claiming that Mosley's death was caused by a brain disease. Id.
While no one testified to having seen the fall, several witnesses, including the
insured's wife and son, testified that Mosley had said that he fell down a flight of
stairs and had complained of pain. Id. at 399-400. The Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment entered for the plaintiff. Id. at 397, 409.
45. Id. at 404, quoted in HiUmon, 145 U.S. at 296.
46. See HiUmon, 145 U.S. at 296-98.
47. Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards, 1 C.P.D. 154 (1876). The case has been
harshly criticized. See, e.g., Hinton, supra note 42, at 404 n.26.
48. 40 NJ.L. 495 (1878).
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crime itself.49 On that theory, and "on general principles," the
declaration was admitted. 50 Nowhere, however, did the court
suggest that the declaration fell within an established exception to
the hearsay rule.
Consequently, contrary to the Hillmon Court's assertion, its
resolution of the evidence question was supported by neither
principle 5 ' nor authority. 5 2 No public policy was mentioned by
49. For a discussion of the resgestae doctrine and its relationship to the hearsay rule, see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 38, § 288, at 835-36. Some commentators have criticized res gestae as a vague and meaningless doctrine. See, e.g.,
Hinton, supra note 42, at 300 n.20; Morgan, A Suggested Classificationof Utterances
Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922).
50. 40 N.J.L. at 540. The res gestae doctrine was likely misapplied to this
situation. See Seligman, supra note 11, at 160.
51. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text. One could make another
argument against the Hillmon doctrine by pointing out that the declaration of an
intention to do an act is weak proof that the act was accomplished or even eventually undertaken. In support of this argument, one need only point to Walters'
letters. Walters not only told his fiancee that he intended to go with Hillmon
but also told her, "I will drop you a letter occasionally until I get settled down
... . When I get back you will get to see me in about the same way we parted
(you bet)." J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, at 875. Clearly Walters fulfilled neither
of these other intentions. While this argument diminishes the impact of the evidence substantially, some commentators suggest it goes to the relevance of the
evidence rather than to admissibility as an exception to the hearsay rule. R.
LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 428 (2d ed.
4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 803(3)[041, at 803-118.

1982);

Although the analysis employed by the Hilimon Court is faulty, support for
the decision has been offered on other grounds. One court has cited Hillmon for
the proposition that when a plaintiff must rely on circumstantial evidence, the
court will be very generous in admitting evidence necessary to establish the case.
See Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.Johnson, 275 F. 757, 760 (8th Cir. 1921).
This explanation of Hillmon fails because the defendants in Hillmon were the
ones who offered the evidence and also because the case was not one of necessity. Ample evidence was available to all litigants without the letters. See supra
notes 18-19 & 43.
Another commentator has said the Hilimon result makes sense because the
jury would have drawn a negative inference from the absence of proof of Walters' intent to travel, and that identification of the body by Walters' relatives
would have appeared suspicious without such evidence. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence,
66 CALIF. L. REV. 1011, 1048-49 (1978). This argument also assumes that the
defendants were faced with a paucity of evidence, and that Walters' letters were
necessary to establish the case of the insurance companies. Given the volume of
other evidence available to the defendants, one must seriously doubt whether
any juror would have drawn a negative inference in the absence of a declaration
by Walters of an intent to travel.
In a subsequent article, the same commentator and a co-author pointed out
that Tribe's concept of triangulation of hearsay offers some support for the admission of the letters. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra, at 428 (citing
Tribe, supra note 11). Professor Tribe used a "Testimonial Triangle" to demonstrate the basic hearsay problem of establishing a chain of inferences. See Tribe,
supra note 11, at 959. The first link is from the act or utterance of a "person not
subject to contemporaneous in-court cross-examination about the act or utter-
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the Court, and indeed none seems applicable. One is forced to
conclude that the result preceded the reasoning. 53 The history of
the case indicates that a majority of the Court had decided that
plaintiff Sallie Hillmon was pursuing a fraudulent claim. In order
to reach the correct result, the Court engaged in tortured reasoning which incidentally yielded a new exception to the hearsay
rule.

54

ance" to the belief held by the person responsible for the act or utterance. Id. at
958. Tribe noted that the first link is similar to a " 'trip' into the head of a
person responsible for the act or utterance (the declarant) to see what she was
really thinking when the act occurred." Id. The second link is from the declarant's belief to a conclusion to which the declarant's belief points. Id. Tribe saw
the second link as "a trip out of the head of the declarant, in order to match the
declarant's assumed belief with the external reality sought to be demonstrated."
Id.
The Testimonial Triangle's chain of inferences can be met, however, only
after the declarant has overcome certain obstacles. Id. at 959. In the first link, to
go from the act or utterance to the belief, the "left leg" obstacles of the triangle-ambiguity and insincerity-have to be overcome. Id. In the second link, to
go from the belief to the conclusion, the "right leg" obstacles of the trianglememory and faulty perception- must be overcome. Id. According to Lempert
and Saltzburg, no right leg problems (memory, perception) exist with regard to
the declarations, although both left leg problems persist (ambiguity, insincerity).
See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra, at 428 (citing Tribe, supra note 11). While
this analysis is accurate, the potentially severe left leg problems coupled with the
relevance problem discussed above seemingly should combine to hold the offer
out of evidence. That result would seem even more desirable in light of the
expansions of the doctrine developed later in this article. For a discussion of
Tribe's triangulation model, see infra notes 87-90 & 121 and accompanying text.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 44-50. The authority supporting the
decision is further eroded by Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U.S. 552 (1901),
handed down by the Court only nine years after Hillmon. In Throckmorton, the
declaration of a testator was offered to show that his intention was inconsistent
with the terms of the will. The inference that the signature was forged followed.
Without even mentioning Hilimon, the Court's opinion excluded the declaration
as purely hearsay, "no more admissible than would be his unsworn declarations
as to any other fact." Id. at 573. Logically, authorities supporting the admission
of a declaration of intention to show that an act was accomplished should also
support the admission of a declaration of intention to show that an act was not
accomplished. The Court thought not. Cf Hinton, supra note 42, at 412.
53. See Maguire, supra note 2, at 711-12.
54. Ironically, the Court need not have created the Hillmon doctrine because it had already decided to reverse for error in denying each defendant its
own peremptory challenges. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Apparently the Court believed that additional guidance on the evidence point was desirable for the next trial judge and jury, so that the appropriate result could be
reached. This effort came to naught, as juries four and five disagreed and jury
six returned another plaintiffs verdict. The defendants then advanced 108 assignments of error-mostly evidence rulings-but the circuit court affirmed. See
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 107 F. 834 (8th Cir. 1901), rev'd, 188
U.S. 208 (1903). The case thus returned from the grave to haunt the Supreme
Court eleven years later.
Another questionably reasoned reversal followed, based on two evidence
rulings. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 188 U.S. 208 (1903). First,
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The vice of the difficult case is its creation of a doctrine which
is then set loose into the stream ofjudicial process. That process
seizes on a rule of law created to do justice in a particularized fact
situation and begins to apply it to other, analogous factual situations. As the years accumulate, the fact patterns thought by guile
or inadvertence to be sufficiently analogous become more and
more unlike the facts for which the rule was crafted.
After a brief section summarizing the early critical comment
on Hilimon, this article will examine the development of the
Hillmon doctrine. First, the development of the use of a declaration of intention to prove the actions of another person will be
traced. Second, a declaration of present state of mind to prove a
past act will be examined. This development met apparent death
in Shepard v. United States,5 5 but has been reborn, most notably in
United States v. Annunziato. 56 Third, a proposal that admission of a
declaration of intention be conditioned on the unavailability of
the declarant will be analyzed.
III.

EARLY COMMENTARY ON HILLMON

Early commentary

on Hilimon was apparently favorable,

John Brown appeared at the sixth trial only by deposition. The trial judge allowed into evidence Brown's affidavit stating that Hillmon shot another, see
supra note 19, but only for the limited purpose of impeaching the deposition.
The Supreme Court held the affidavit constituted substantive evidence. The
Court's theory for admitting the affidavit is not made clear. Brown was not a
party, so the statement could not be his admission. A declaration against penal
interest was not recognized at that time. The theory must have paralleled the
admission by a coconspirator theory that was expressly used for admission on
the second evidence question. This second question involved evidence of declarations of Levi Baldwin that created an inference of a conspiracy to defraud the
insurance companies. See supra note 19. The trial court excluded evidence of
the declarations. The Supreme Court reasoned the statements were admissible
on the theory that they were admissions of a coconspirator, since Sallie Hillmon
was a successor in interest to her coconspirator husband. That conclusion is
highly doubtful. No evidence linked plaintiff Sallie Hillmon personally with the
conspiracy, and she was not a successor in interest to her husband because the
claim on the insurance policy did not arise until his alleged death. The Court's
theory does not respond to these readily apparent weaknesses. Again, the Court
seemed not about to allow the perceived scheme to succeed; it was willing to
reach the necessary result by whatever reasoning process was required. We can
only be thankful that the "admission by a successor in interest to a coconspirator" theory has not also flowered in the law of evidence.
The second opinion was written by Justice Henry Brown, which leads to the
suggestion that the Hillmon litigation was not a matter of black and white, but
rather shades of Gray and Brown.
55. 290 U.S. 96 (1933). For a discussion of Shepard, see infra notes 123-31
and accompanying text.
56. 293 F.2d 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961). For a discussion of Annunziato, see infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
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although it failed to appreciate the "profound technical possibilities" of the doctrine. 57 Not until nearly twenty years after the decision was the first critical notice rendered, in an article by
Eustace Seligman. 58 He argued that the Hilimon doctrine is antithetical to the hearsay rule because of its logical extensions. Even
though the Hilimon case seemed only a small step from a declaration of intent to prove state of mind in issue to a declaration of
intent to prove a subsequent act, Seligman argued that in fact the
step is a leap which propels courts on the road to abolition of the
hearsay rule. This is so because, as Seligman says, if such evidence is admissible, then logically all hearsay is admissible. If a
declaration of intent to do an act is acceptable, then no logical
reason exists for excluding a declaration of state of mind of hav59
ing done an act.
There is merit to Seligman's argument. Certainly the out-ofcourt statement "I am in Crooked Creek" or "I was in Crooked
Creek" cannot be admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted under our law of evidence. 60 Yet these are declarations of
present -state of mind and past state of mind. Should these be
excluded, what basis is there for admitting a statement of a present intention to do an act in the future? A declaration of past
events involves the danger of faulty memory, but there is no
memory problem with a present state of mind declaration. Perhaps the declarant may have a poorer perception of her present
surroundings than of her own present state of mind of intention;
but given the likelihood that an intention may be frustrated or
changed, this difference appears insufficient to explain a different
evidentiary result. Fortunately, we need not resolve this debate.
We need only note that little analytical difference exists between
the situations. And this is precisely Seligman's point: if Hilimon
makes future intent admissible, then present and past tense decla57. Maguire, supra note 2, at 710. See also Morgan, The Law of Evidence,
1941-45, 59 HARV. L. REV. 481, 571 (1946).
58. See Seligman, supra note 11.
59. Id. at 155. According to Seligman, "I know I left A $1000" is a statement of present mental condition. Id. at 156. See also Maguire, supra note 2, at
711 (quoting Thayer, Observations on the Law of Evidence, 13 MICH. L. REV. 355,
365 (1915)). Cf R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 51, at 425.
60. See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 43, at 284. The analysis for the
first statement may be different under rule 803(1), which allows a present sense
impression to be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule. See FED. R. EVID.
803(1). Hutchins and Slesinger agree that if statements of intent to do a subsequent act are admissible, exclusion of statements of presently existing state of
mind to prove past or present facts would be logically absurd. See Hutchins &
Slesinger, supra note 43, at 287.
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rations should logically also be admissible. The logical path to
the destruction of the hearsay rule is blazed.
To those who would argue that the courts can halt such logical extensions of the Hillmon doctrine, Seligman answered that evidence law must be consistent, rational, and analytical, not ad
hoc. 6 1 This writer would also answer that such an argument fails
to account for the natural, indeed inevitable, progression of the
judicial process on a rule of law once it is announced and found
workable. The Hilimon doctrine is workable in the day-to-day life
of the practicing lawyer and trial judge; in fact, this is a major
argument in support of the doctrine. The difficulty is that a principle unfettered by logic and tolerated only because it seems to
work on a practical level will undoubtedly rise like water to its
own level, and fill the logical void.
Professor Maguire, writing five years later, agreed with Seligman on the logical level, but disagreed on the practical level.
Maguire recognized that the Hilimon doctrine initially appeared to
be a "dynamite charge at the base of the hearsay rule," but then
suggested that "slow poison" was a more apt metaphor. 62 He
noted that no deleterious effects had been shown by the cases,
and ventured that "[a]nalytically, the principle appears much
63
more safely boxed in than Mr. Seligman believed."
While recognizing that "[e]fforts to narrow the doctrine have
not had much success," Maguire suggested two "obvious" limitations on the extension of the Hilimon doctrine. 64 The first pro61. "It is impossible, if the law of evidence is to be a rational science and
not merely a collocation of arbitrary historical rules, to have the Hillmon case and
the hearsay rule stand side by side." Seligman, supra note 11, at 157.
62. Maguire, supra note 2, at 731.
63. Id. In 1925, Professor Maguire argued that on an empirical basis, the
Hillmon doctrine had not endangered the hearsay rule. His findings revealed
that in the 33 years of judicial opinion since Hillmon, the doctrine had not been
extended unduly. Id. The perspective of an additional six decades of decisions
since Maguire's article, however, compels the conclusion that this empirical base
is fast eroding, if it has not already washed out completely.
64. Maguire, supra note 2, at 715. Recognizing as he did that the Hilimon
rule was well suited to the workaday world of the courts and that attempts to
narrow the doctrine had already proved fruitless, perhaps Professor Maguire
should have been more prescient about the probable trend of the judicial process. He should have realized that the courts would not carefully analyze future
cases in terms of a science of evidence, but instead would use what worked. In
Hilimon itself, the Court could easily have taken the apparently innocuous step of
declaring a state of mind of a past act acceptable as an exception to the hearsay
rule. Maguire, supra note 2, at 712. Maguire supposed that this was because the
attack on the hearsay rule in Hillmon was "cloaked and disguised." Id. at 716.
Although Maguire expected the courts to be "thoroughly awakened" to such
attacks in the future, the decisions do not bear out his optimism. Indeed, the
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vided that a Hilimon declaration should not be admissible to prove
the acts of another person. 65 The second provided that a past fact
could not be proved by such evidence; in other words, a Hilimontype statement must relate to an intention to do an act in the fu66
ture and not to an act already accomplished in the past.
The development of these two suggested limitations will be
discussed in turn. The courts have obliterated the first and despite a major setback, are in the process of cascading over the
second.
IV.

HILLMON DECLARATIONS To PROVE AN ACT OF ANOTHER

When the declarant's statement includes not only his own intention to do an act but also another person's participation in that
act, the analysis changes drastically. No longer is the declarant
speaking only for his own state of mind. Instead, the statement
now includes either the state of mind of another or the past act or
declaration of another. Thus, to say that "[t]he letters in question
were competent . . .as evidence that . . . [Walters] had the in-

tention of going, and of going with Hillmon, which made it more
probable both that he did go and that he went with Hillmon," 6 7 is
construed to say that Hillmon had agreed to go with Walters.
The statement could then be used to prove the state of mind of
the other person, viz. Hillmon's intention to go with Walters.
This, in turn, would be circumstantial evidence that the other person (Hillmon) acted on this intention.
A.

The Cases

The modern line of cases on this point begins in 1944 with a
California case, People v. Alcalde.6 8 Defendant "Frank" Alcalde was
charged with first degree murder. The circumstantial evidence of
courts have oscillated from unblinking awareness to narcolepsy. Compare United
States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099
(1977) with Brown v. Tard, 552 F. Supp. 1341 (D.N.J. 1982).
65. Maguire, supra note 2, at 715. Maguire argued that in these situations
the "risk runs so high and ulterior purpose is so apparent" the evidence should
be excluded, although he recognized that there may be not only a dissenting
opinion, but also a majority opinion which is "contra to the general run of authorities." Id. at 718.
66. Id. at 715. While generally approving the extension of the Hilimon doctrine, Professor Hinton also cautioned against this second collision with the
hearsay rule. Hinton, supra note 42, at 422-23.
67. Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 295-96.
68. 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944). There had been earlier cases with
similar fact patterns. See State v. Perelli, 125 Conn. 321, 5 A.2d 705 (1939);
State v. Farnam, 82 Ore. 211, 161 P. 417 (1916).
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his guilt produced at trial was overwhelming. Defendant's only
defense was alibi, and his two alibi witnesses directly contradicted
him. As part of its evidence, the prosecution presented a statement made by the victim while she was dressing to go out for the
evening. She said she was going out with Frank. Over a sharp
dissent, 6 9 the statement was admitted to prove an inference that
"the thing was done."7 0° Thus, the victim's statement was admitted as circumstantial evidence of what a third person, the defendant, probably did. One cannot help but suspect that in this
seminal case the court was so impressed with the weight of evidence against the defendant that it was little disposed to reverse
the conviction for error.
Little reported activity occurred for more than thirty years,
except for an occasional decision following Alcalde. 7 1 Then, in
1976, United States v. Pheaster72 was decided. The facts paralleled
Alcalde in what now appears to be an archetypal fact pattern.
Hugh Pheaster and Angelo Incisco were indicted for conspiracy to kidnap Larry Adell for ransom. Larry, sixteen years old,
was with a group of his high school friends at a local restaurant,
Sambo's North, in Palm Springs. At approximately 9:30 p.m., he
left the restaurant and was never seen again. A long series of negotiations between Larry's father and the kidnappers began
shortly after the disappearance. By telephone and then by ten
letters, Larry's father was given instructions for paying ransom.
69. See Alcalde, 24 Cal. 2d at 189-90, 148 P.2d at 633 (Traynor, J., dissenting). Justice Traynor pointed out that the declaration of the victim's intent to go
out with the defendant also was a declaration that the defendant intended to go
out with her, and that the jury would likely "conclude that it tended to prove the
acts of the defendant as well as of the declarant ...... Id. at 190, 148 P.2d at
633 (Traynor, J., dissenting). He reasoned that since the whereabouts of the
victim at the time of the crime was not in issue, the only purpose of the statement would be to place the defendant with the victim, a purpose not allowed by
the exception to the hearsay rule. Traynor concluded, "[h]er declarations cannot be admitted for that purpose without setting aside the rule against hearsay."
Id.
70. Id. at 185, 148 P.2d at 631. In admitting the evidence, the majority
relied on other corroborative facts, and also placed several limitations on the
admission of such evidence. The court noted the unavailability of the declarant
and the delivery of limiting instructions to the jury, and appeared to require
circumstances of trustworthiness surrounding the declaration. Id. at 185-86,
148 P.2d at 632.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1975) (deceased intended to speak to defendant about ending business relationship), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976); State v. Thornton, 38 N.J. 380, 185 A.2d 9 (1962)
(deceased stated intention to visit defendant), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 816 (1963);
State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 180 S.E.2d 755 (1971) (declaration by victim he
was going to take a trip with defendant), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
72. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977).
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One month after Larry left the restaurant, the kidnappers broke
off communications. Two weeks after that, the defendants
Pheaster and Incisco were arrested.
At trial, the evidence against Hugh Pheaster was "overwhelming." 73 The evidence against Angelo Incisco was much less
weighty. It consisted in part of declarations by Larry of his intent
to meet Incisco that night. Larry's date for the evening testified
that Larry planned to meet Incisco at Sambo's North at 9:30 to
"pick up a pound of marijuana which Angelo had promised him
for free." 74 Another friend testified he was with Larry in the restaurant, and that when Larry got up to leave the table, he had said
'7 5
that "he was going to meet Angelo and he'd be right back."
These statements were offered by the government for "the limited purpose of showing the 'state of mind of Larry.' "76 The trial
judge admitted the declarations, and gave limiting instructions to
the jury. The defendants were convicted.
Both defendants appealed their convictions to the Ninth Circuit. Judge Charles Renfrew, sitting by designation from the
Northern District of California, filed a meticulous, well-documented opinion. 77 Despite his apparent distaste for the Hillmon
doctrine,7 8 Judge Renfrew wrote, "we cannot conclude that the
district court erred in allowing the testimony concerning Larry
Adell's statements to be introduced." 79 Recognizing the conceptual difficulties of applying Hilimon to acts of another, the court
nevertheless held the evidence admissible on the strength of prior
73. Id. at 383.
74. Id. at 375.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 374 n. 11. At trial, the government relied on three theories of
admissibility. The evidence was said to be admissible: 1) as a declaration
against penal interest (intention to obtain marijuana); 2) as showing the mental
state of Larry (coupled with other statements of Larry-ultimately never introduced-regarding his fear of being kidnapped by Angelo); and 3) as a HiUmon
declaration. On appeal, the government relied exclusively on the Hil/mon doctrine for admissibility. Id.
77. Id. at 358. CircuitJudgeJ. Clifford Wallace joined the opinion. Circuit
Judge Walter Ely dissented on the evidence question. Id. at 384 (Ely, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. Judge Renfrew began the discussion by noting "controversy and confusion" in the Hillmon doctrine, which he labelled an "extraordinary doctrine." Id.
at 376. The opinion then identified the "theoretical awkwardness" of applying
the doctrine to the act of another, and briefly outlined the arguments against
that application. Id. at 377-79. Judge Renfrew noted that "the force of the objection to the application . . . has come from very distinguished quarters, both
judicial and academic." Id. at 380 n.18.
79. Id. at 380.
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decisions (primarily Hillmon and Alcalde), and the comments to the
8
California Evidence Code 0 and the Federal Rules of Evidence. '
The Pheaster decision gave new impetus to this breach of the
hearsay rule, and many recent decisions have followed the Pheaster
83
court through the opening,8 2 with only a few staying behind.
Today, the generally accepted rule is that a Hillmon-type state84
ment is admissible to prove the act of another person.
80. Because the advisory committee comment to the California Evidence
Code cites Alcalde with approval, the court inferred that the code supports application of Hillmon to the act of another. Pheaster, 544 F.2d at 379 (citing CAL.
EvID. CODE § 1250 advisory committee comment (West 1966)).
81. Rule 803(3) allows admission of a statement of the declarant's intent.
See supra note 13. Larry's statement showed his intent. The Advisory Committee
noted that the Hillmon doctrine would be incorporated "undisturbed." FED. R.
EvID. 803(3) advisory committee note. This, Judge Renfrew posited, indicated
that Hillmon could be applied to the act of another. Pheaster, 544 F.2d at 379-80.
See also infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., State v. Abernathy, 265 Ark. 218, 577 S.W.2d 591 (1979) (victim intended to go to meet defendant); State v. Cugliata, 372 A.2d 1019 (Me.)
(victim intended to go on trip with defendant), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977);
People v. Malizia, 92 A.D.2d 154, 460 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1983) (victim intended to
meet defendant); State v. Fewell, 38 N.C. App. 592, 248 S.E.2d 351 (1978) (victim going to meet defendant); Commonwealth v. Lowenberg, 481 Pa. 244, 392
A.2d 1274 (1978) (victim intended to confront defendant on financial matter).
See also Hayes v. State, 395 So. 2d 127 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (admitted as res
gestae); Trostle v. State, 588 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (victim's intention to see defendant to tell him to move out of her boarding house admitted as
res gestae). Compare People v. Jones, 84 Ill. App. 3d 896, 406 N.E.2d 112 (1980)
(statement of victim concerning act of defendant admitted) with People v. Cole,
29 Ill. App. 3d 369, 329 N.E.2d 880 (1975) (Hillmon doctrine not to be applied
to criminal cases).
83. See, e.g., Gual Morales v. Hernandez Vega, 579 F.2d 677, 680 n.2 (1st
Cir. 1978) (dictum that statement by nonparty of intention to see defendant
would not be admissible against that defendant); Clark v. United States, 412
A.2d 21 (D.C. 1980) (victim intended to meet defendant at location where she
was killed); People v. Lauro, 91 Misc. 2d 706, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
(victim intended to present financial ultimatum to husband-defendant).
84. See supra note 82. In addition, several other courts have stated the general rule to be that Hillmon-type statements are admissible to prove the act of
another. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 76, 82 n.3 (2d Cir. 1978)
(courts have generally held that Hillmon declarations of intent are admissible as
evidence of actions of intent of declarant and others) (dictum); Brown v. Tard,
552 F. Supp. 1341, 1352 (D.N.J. 1982) ("[u]nder the Hillmon doctrine, statements are admissible not only to prove the future conduct of the declarant but
also the future conduct of other persons when the declarant's intention requires
the action of these other persons if it is to be fulfilled"); State v. Philbrick, 436
A.2d 844, 862 (Me. 1981) ("[ilt seems clear that the Hillmon-[rule] 803(3) exception to the hearsay rule is broad enough to encompass . . . the involvement of
other persons in the declarant's plan") (dictum). Cf United States v. Cicale, 691
F.2d 95, 108 (2d Cir. 1982) (coconspirator's statement that he was going to meet
a "friend" was acceptable with regard to a defendant whom the coconspirator
met).
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Analysis

To hold that state of mind declarations are admissible to
prove not only the subsequent actions of the declarant but also
the subsequent actions of another person presents conceptual
and practical difficulties that will now be explored. For convenience and clarity, the fact situation of Pheaster will be employed.
The statement "I am going to meet Angelo" supports an inference that the declarant's state of mind-his intention-was to
go and meet Angelo. In turn, the inference follows that the declarant went. So much is Hilimon. But in Hilimon, Walters' presence was the fact to be proved. The fact of Larry Adell's presence
in the parking lot was not relevant to any issue in Pheaster. In
Hillmon, the issue was the declarant's location; in Alcalde, Pheaster,
and the cases following in their wake the issue was another person's location. A giant step has been taken.
This giant step from Hillmon to Pheaster requires additional
inferences. Placing Larry at the scene of the crime has no probative value. To place Angelo at the scene is the fact to be proved.
From our knowledge that Larry intended to meet Angelo, we infer that Angelo was present. Certainly the relevance of the statement is significantly diminished by the additional inference
required. One person's intention to do an act is easily hindered.
But easier still is hindering an intention which requires the cooperation of two. Larry's intention to meet Angelo might have been
frustrated for any number of reasons affecting him alone. But in
order for the meeting to occur, we must also consider Angelo's
actions. Angelo, even assuming he intended to meet Larry, might
also have had his intention frustrated at any time.
Arguably the addition of this second contingency speaks to
relevance and not to the hearsay exception. For example, the
Pheaster court thought the additional inference showed a difference in degree rather than kind. 85 The court is correct if one
looks solely at the relevance analysis, but the difference of degree
might be so extreme that it really amounts to a difference in kind.
What inferential steps are required to reach the crucial fact
that the other person also was present? From Larry's statement
of intention to meet Angelo, we infer that he had some reason85. Pheaster, 544 F.2d at 376. The Ninth Circuit reasoned as follows: "The
possible unreliability of the inference to be drawn from the present intention is a
matter going to the weight of the evidence which might be argued to the trier of
fact, but it should not be a ground for completely excluding the admittedly rele-

vant evidence." Id. n.14.
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able basis for his intention. From that we infer that Angelo had
communicated with the declarant Larry to give him that reasonable basis. From that we infer that Angelo had agreed to meet
Larry at the desired location. If we stop here, Larry's declaration
becomes essentially, "Angelo has agreed to meet me in the parking lot at 9:30." No court would admit this bald hearsay statement. 6 Should we press further? From Angelo's agreement to
meet Larry, we can infer that he had an intention to go to the
parking lot himself. From Angelo's intention to go to the parking
lot, we can infer that he did go. The circle is complete.
The problem is that we have inferred into Angelo's mind,
and he is not the declarant. The hearsay rule must break the
chain of inferences at some point. Otherwise, the fabric of inference is stretched too thin and loses its body. In this case, the
additional stretching has been necessary because the fact to be
proved is the act of another person, not the act of the declarant.
In addition to severe relevance problems, this extension to include the actions of another person introduces additional hearsay
dangers.
The four traditional hearsay dangers are ambiguity, insincerity, memory, and perception.8 7 Professor Tribe places the first
two dangers on the left leg of a hearsay triangle, and the latter
two dangers on a right leg.88 The traditional statement of inten86. Cf id. at 377. But cf. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 377 n.1 (suggestion by
Judge Friendly that requiring assumption of prior agreement between declarant
and third person may be overstatement).
87. See Tribe, supra note 11. The most recent edition of McCormick's treatise combines "ambiguity" and "sincerity" into one category which he labels
"inaccuracy of narration." See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 38, § 245 at 726.
88. See Tribe, supra note 11. Tribe noted that these dangers may be reduced in three situations. Id. at 961. First, they may be overcome by prior or
subsequent cross-examination in court. Id. A delayed subsequent cross-examination, however, will remove only the "left leg" dangers. Id. at 963. Second,
these dangers are irrelevant in certain situations in which "a party has no right to
cross-examine with respect to particular testimony." Id. For example, an "estoppel-like" responsibility is imposed on each party for its agent's statements. Id. at
964. Third, the dangers may be reduced by "specific attributes of the out-ofcourt act or utterance which are thought to reduce the triangle's weaknesses so
substantially that the balance of untrustworthiness and likelihood of probative
value favors admissibility of the evidence." Id. This category is further subdivided into two groups, each of which eliminates the dangers on one leg of the
triangle. Id. Tribe explained that the clearest example of the first subgroup,
which removes the left leg dangers, is the declaration against interest. Id. In
this case, the sincerity question is resolved by the "assumption that a person is
unlikely to make a statement adverse to himself unless he believes it to be true."
Id. at 964-65. Moreover, the ambiguity danger is eliminated by admitting only
unambiguous statements against the declarant's interest. In this situation, however, the "right leg" dangers remain significant. An example of the second sub-
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tion to do an act involves no right leg problems because a declarant can certainly perceive his own mind (no psychological
arguments here, please) and there is no danger of memory loss
with a present intention. Left leg dangers do exist-the statement may be ambiguous or be uttered to mislead-but these dan89
gers are not thought serious enough to warrant exclusion.
When we use a declarant's statement of intention to infer the
act of another, we immediately encounter all four hearsay dangers. The left leg dangers, ambiguity and insincerity, are heightened. Now both the declarant's and the other person's
statements may be ambiguous. Insincerity is a vital concern given
the possible criminal intent of the other person. 90 We also encounter the other two hearsay dangers full-blown. Perception
problems spring up because the declarant may not have accurately perceived her agreement with the other person. Memory
problems arise because the declarant is relying on her memory of
the agreement. Given these hearsay dangers and the problems of
relevance, it seems that the Hilimon doctrine has been stretched so
thin as to snap the chain of inference.
The wrong of including the act of another in a statement of
intention is that the statement must face both forward to the intention and backward to the prior agreement or statement by the
other person. Statements which look backward are not generally
admitted under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. 9 '
Based on the foregoing discussion, one can see that the evidentiary analysis of a statement of intent that includes the act of
group, which removes the obstacles of the right leg, is statement of present
physical or mental sensations. Id. "The closeness in time of statement to perception reduces memory problems to the de minimis level, and for a number of
reasons, including the fact that what one perceives as his physical or mental sensations are his sensations, there is ordinarily no possibility of erroneous perception." Id. The left leg obstacles remain, however. Id.
89. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 51, at 428.
90. Several courts have mentioned the circumstances surrounding a typical
Hilimon statement as evidencing trustworthiness. They argue that a declarant
would not likely lie to his relatives about his destination and the statement would
be a natural incident of going. Also, it would be natural for the declarant to
mention his travelling companion. See, e.g., Hunter v. State, 40 N.J.L. 495 (1878)
(in murder prosecution, victim had previously declared his intention to travel to
a specific location with the defendant). Yet with the inclusion of the other person, these circumstances of trustworthiness evaporate. In fact, the other person,
if possessing criminal intent, would have a strong motive indeed to fabricate. See
infra text accompanying notes 227-28.
91. FED. R. EviD. 803(3). This rule embodies the pre-existing common law
rule first announced in Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933). The doctrine is discussed at length infra in Section V.
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another is quite different in degree and character from a true
Hillmon statement. Yet, no court has offered a carefully reasoned
92
analysis that would support the admission of such statements.
Instead, courts rely on the force of precedent and an unexpressed
92. Most courts have simply cited to precedent, usually the landmark cases
of Hilimon, Alcalde, or Pheaster. Hilimon did not discuss the issue. Alcalde said only
that the "evidence was admitted for the limited purpose of showing the decedent's intention," and thus avoided the issue. 24 Cal. 2d at 185, 148 P.2d at
630. Pheaster recognized the issue, rejected Alcalde's theory of limited purpose
because of the prejudice involved, but then sidestepped by saying, "we cannot
conclude that the district court erred in allowing the testimony . . . to be introduced." 544 F.2d at 375 n.12, 380.
Some commentators have suggested that the circumstances surrounding
the statements justify the result in cases like Pheaster and Alcalde. See, e.g., R.
LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 51, at 429-30; G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION

TO THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 224-26 (1978). For example, other evidence showed
that the victim in Alcalde was making preparations to go out for the evening.
Given those preparations, and her statement, she most likely would have gone
out only with Frank, the person with whom she expressed an intention to leave.
This may be so, but this strengthening of the inference appears to support only
the increased relevance of the statement. It does not appear to affect the hearsay analysis.
Others have approved a "flexible view" which advocates admitting the
statement as part of the "matrix of circumstantial evidence," relying on limiting
instructions and the burden of proof to cure any problems. See C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 38, § 270, at 574-75 (1954); 4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERcER, supra note
15, 803(3)[04], at 803-105. To say that the statement is.part of a matrix of
circumstantial evidence is to say little or nothing. To rely on limiting instructions and burdens of proof to remove prejudice is like trying to block the jurors'
ears against the "reverberating clang of those accusatory words." Shepard v.
United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933). Cf. United States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp.
903 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (court imposed numerous burdens on government before
it would admit hearsay statements as statement of conspirator), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 720 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1423 (1984). The
third edition of the McCormick treatise does not carry forward the suggestion.
See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 38, § 295, at 846-51.
The problem with relying on limiting instructions can best be shown by the
case of State v. Cugliata, 372 A.2d 1019 (Me. 1977). The victim of a murder had
stated his intention of travelling to a drug deal. He intended to be accompanied
by two people, one of whom was named Frank. The defendant's name was
Frank. The trial court admitted the declaration with the following limiting instruction: "[Tihe only thing... [the statement] will establish for you would be
that there existed, if in fact you find that it does establish that, an intention in the
mind of the decedent to make a trip, and also as bearing upon whether or not in
fact he did make such a trip." Id. at 1026. Perhaps the intention did indeed tend
to establish that the decedent took a trip. What that trip had to do with the
issues of the case is not specified. Clearly, the only purpose of the statement was
to name defendant as the deceased's companion on the trip. A realistic observer
must doubt that the jury failed to glean that fact from the declaration, despite
the limiting instructions. For further discussion of Cugliata, see infra note 189-92
and accompanying text. Judge Learned Hand pungently noted that the limiting
instruction in criminal cases is a "recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else [sic]." Nash v.
United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932).
And judge Jerome Frank thought the limiting instruction in the criminal case a
"judicial lie" which "damages the decent administration of justice." United
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reluctance to reverse the conviction of a person who is clearly
guilty. Poorly reasoned use of precedent has triumphed over pru93
dent hearsay analysis to create the general rule.
Despite these difficulties, there are two analyses not previously discussed which may offer a basis for admission of the statement. In the first analysis, we start with the observation that since
a statement of intent to meet another person is in reality a statement that the other person also intends to meet the declarant, the
statement must necessarily look back to a prior declaration of the
other person. Thus, implicit in Larry's statement "I intend to
meet Angelo tonight" is a prior statement by Angelo to Larry, "I
intend to meet you at 9:30 at Sambo's North, Larry." Given this,
is not Larry's statement a matter of hearsay within hearsay? Larry
is stating his present intention, but within that he is also stating
Angelo's intention previously expressed to him. The statement
is, "I intend to meet, Angelo and he has stated his intention to
meet me." The former portion of the declaration is admissible
under the present contours of the Hilimon doctrine. The latter
portion, to be admissible, must be supported by its own hearsay
exception. But, if Hilimon allows a witness on the stand to say,
"Larry told me, 'I intend to go to the parking lot,' " should not
Larry in effect also be allowed to declare "Angelo told me, 'I intend to meet you in the parking lot' "? The Hillmon doctrine
would thus serve to admit each level of hearsay in the entire
statement.
The second analysis derives from a small group of cases previously classified only with the act of another group.9 4 These few
cases involve declarations of intent which do not inextricably bind
the actions of the other person into the statement. Instead of declaring an intention to meet another (requiring a prior agreement
or declaration of intent by the other person and thus looking
backward), the declaration is of an intent to seek out another perStates v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 574 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391
(1957).
93. See supra notes 82 & 84 and accompanying text.
94. See United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 910 (8th Cir. 1975) ("[deceased] intended to speak to the defendant about cancelling the insurance and
getting out of the partnership"), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976); Commonwealth v. Lowenberg, 481 Pa. 244, 250, 392 A.2d 1274, 1278-79 (1978) ("[deceased] wanted to see appellant on a financial matter, '. . . far worse than
borrowing money' "); Trostle v. State, 588 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Tex. Crim. 1979)
("[deceased] was going to tell appellant to move out of the house"). But see
People v. Lauro, 91 Misc. 2d 706, 707, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503, 503 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
("intention of the deceased to present to her husband ... a financial offer in the
nature of an ultimatum" rejected as requiring too many inferences).
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son (requiring no prior agreement or intent by the other person
and thus looking entirely forward). The fact pattern of these
cases is from the same mold: the declarant states an intent to
confront the defendant. The declarant is later murdered. The
state offers the intention as some evidence of motive. Since no
past action is involved, no problem of memory or perception is
presented. The analysis is pure Hilimon, and it makes the small
group of cases acceptable-if one first accepts the Hillmon
doctrine.
C.

Present Status of the Law

The Advisory Committee drafting the Federal Rules of Evidence had the opportunity to deal with the conceptual problem of
including the action of another in a declaration of intention, but
commented only, "The rule of [Hillmon], allowing evidence of intention as tending to prove the doing of the act intended, is, of
course, left undisturbed.- 9 5 Whether that meant Hillmon could be
interpreted to include the act of another was not addressed.
When the Rules passed through Congress, however, the House
Judiciary Committee made clear its disagreement with the Pheaster
result:
[T]he Committee intends that the Rule be construed to
limit the doctrine of [Hillmon], so as to render statements
of intent by a declarant admissible only to prove his future conduct, not the future conduct of another
96
person.
No additional comment was made by the Senate Committee, so
the intent of Congress as to the viability of cases like Pheaster remains ambiguous. 97 Given this ambiguity, and the prior inclination of courts to admit such statements, we can comfortably
predict that Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) will be broadly interpreted so as to continue to allow the admissibility of such statements. Indeed, that has been the result.98
95. FED. R. EvID. 803(3) advisory committee note.
96. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1973), reprintedin 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051.

97. 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 3, § 442, at 562.
98. While the courts have been reluctant to decide directly the issue of the
scope of Hilimon after the adoption of rule 803(3), no court mentioning the
problem has applied the suggested limitation of the HouseJudiciary Committee.
See United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082
(1983); United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
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This acceptance by the courts of the Hilimon-Pheaster result
has lent impetus to additional attacks on the hearsay rule under
the banner of Hilimon. Making Hilimon-Pheastertheir point of departure, the courts continue to stretch the doctrine as the judicial
process surges forward.
In two recent cases, the courts have moved beyond the scope
of admissibility thought appropriate even by the proponents of
the evidence. Both were criminal cases, and in both the government conceded that the evidence was not and could not be offered for the purpose for which the court eventually held it
admissible. 99 The first of these cases is a decision by the Fourth
Circuit, United States v. Jenkins. 10 0 The defendant was charged with
perjury for giving a false reason for taking an automobile trip. He
had said that he went to visit a friend. The prosecution contended that in fact he went to take a "Miss B" to an illicit transaction. Miss B would -not testify that she had asked defendant
Jenkins to drive her, so the government produced a tape recording. During the taped conversation between Miss B and an unidentified third person, Miss B agreed to consumate the
transaction, and ended the conversation with the statement, "I'm
on my way." The government offered this conversation merely to
show that Miss B wanted to go to the rendezvous right away. Of
course that would be irrelevant to a charge of perjury against her
driver, so the court held that the statement could be admitted to
show her intention to go to the meeting, which, when coupled
with the physical evidence that Jenkins and Miss B appeared at
the destination soon thereafter, allowed an inference that she had
asked Jenkins to drive her there.' 0 ' This did go to prove the
perjury.
The statement of Miss B's intention was being used to prove
the state of mind of another person. Miss B's intention to go to
the meeting is unimportant. Only Jenkins' state of mind as he
drove across town is important. Miss B would not have been allowed to testify by hearsay declaration that "Jenkins will drive
me," but she was allowed to do just that by an even more indirect
967 (1978); United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
931 (1978); United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1978).
99. See United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840, 844 n.1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 967 (1978); United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 109 n.1 (2d Cir. 1982)
(Ward, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082
(1983).
100. 579 F.2d 840 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978).
101. Id. at 842.
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hearsay declaration. Her state of mind of intention was proved,
from which the inference followed that she acted on her intention, from which the inference followed that she informed defendant of her intention, from which the inference followed that
defendant developed an intention to assist her, from which the
inference followed that defendant acted on his intention to assist
her. Thus, the court approved a circuitous chain of inferences to
prove an action which could not be proved by a direct statement
because of the bar of the hearsay rule.
A like case is the Second Circuit's decision in United States v.
Cicale.10 2 The declarant stated that he intended to meet an unnamed drug source. Other evidence was offered to show that
shortly thereafter the declarant was seen with defendant Cicale.
The court reasoned that the hearsay problem of using the declarant's statement to prove the subsequent actions of Cicale did not
exist because Cicale's participation in the narcotics scheme was
proved by other, independent evidence.' 0 3 Again, the declaration
of intent by one person was being used to prove the actions of
another, and in a very different way from stating the name of a
person who will accompany the declarant on a trip. All hearsay
dangers were present, and given the criminal nature of the transaction, the danger of insincerity appears especially high.
If a hearsay declaration is allowed to include the state of mind
of another, courts need make only a small leap in allowing a hearsay declaration to prove the state of mind of another. At least
three cases appear to have allowed such a declaration into evidence. The first of these is Brown v. Tard.'0 4 The state contended
that the defendant, a maintenance man, had murdered the declarant. The hearsay declaration at issue was a statement by the victim in a telephone conversation on the morning of her murder.
She said she had "run into one of the guys in the building, the
maintenance guys, and that he was going to come up to fix the air
conditioner."'' 0 5 The declaration was admitted by the state trial
102. 691 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983).
103. Id. at 104. The Second Circuit reasoned as follows: "Statements by
the declarant that he intends to carry out a plan are clearly admissible under
[rule] 803(3), and, if a third party's participation is proven by independent evidence, the Hilimon issue does not arise." Id. The court appears to say that if
other evidence supports a proposition, then the fact that incompetent evidence
was admitted to prove the same proposition may be disregarded. Surely this is
not a correct statement of the law of evidence.
104. 552 F. Supp. 1341 (D.N.J. 1982).
105. Id. at 1350-51. The declaration also included statements that her car
had been broken into and would not run (a past state of mind), and that she was
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judge as a present sense impression. The federal court, hearing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, correctly doubted that the
time lapse allowed admission under that theory, but held that the
declaration was properly admitted as a present state of mind
under the Hilimon doctrine since it indicated the victim's intention
to await the repairman. This is doubtful. The declaration does
not speak of her intention at all. The sole intention expressed is
the intention of the maintenance man to fix the air conditioner.
We have reached the next plateau of the judicial extension of
Hilimon: now a declarant is allowed to declare the state of mind of
another person!
Lest the reader believe that Brown is a sole piece of flotsam in
the sea of judicial opinions, attention is directed to two other
cases. In State v. O'Daniel,'10 6 the court allowed the declaration of
a murder victim into evidence to prove her intention to obtain a
divorce from defendant. So far nothing is new or unusual, but
the letter also contained "the deceased's impression that the appellant is opposed to the divorce or separation."'' 0 7 Again, the
court allowed the declaration of one person to prove the state of
mind of another. The court thought that this statement permitted the inference that the other person acted on his state of mind
08
and committed the crime.1
A second opinion, Commonwealth v. Riggins,10 9 involved another murder prosecution. Again, the declarant was the victim.
The witness was a friend. She testified that earlier on the evening
of the crime she answered the telephone, recognized the voice of
the defendant Louis, and handed the receiver to the victim-declarant. At the end of the conversation, the victim told the witness, "Louis will [be] over later on.""10 The appellate court
approved admission of the evidence as "evidencing her intent to
remain at the house and her willingness to admit him."'I The
waiting for the police (arguably an intention, but irrelevant to any of the issues
in the case). Id. at 1350. See infra text accompanying notes 183-86.
106. 62 Hawaii 518, 616 P.2d 1383 (1980).
107. Id. at 525 n.6, 616 P.2d at 1389 n.6.
108. Id. at 525, 616 P.2d at 1389. In another case, the government earnestly argued for admission of a similar statement through the creation of a
"marital homicide" exception to the hearsay rule. This exception would allow
statements of the decedent to show the defendant's feelings toward the decedent in a marital relationship. The court refused such an extension. See Clark v.
United States, 412 A.2d 21, 27 (D.C. 1980).
109. 478 Pa. 222, 386 A.2d 520 (1978).
110. Id. at 226, 386 A.2d at 522.
111. Id. at 234, 386 A.2d at 526.
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statement says neither of those things, but it does declare the
state of mind of the other person. The court recognized that the
evidence could not be used for the purpose of proving the conduct of the other person, but lamely concluded that the burden of
requiring a limiting instruction was on the accused."l 2 Even if an
appropriate limited purpose were available, one must wonder if
the illicit purpose of identifying the defendant could be kept from
the minds of the jurors. Once again, a court has allowed the declaration by one person to prove the intention of another.
To sum up this section, one of the two major limitations on
the Hilimon doctrine suggested by Maguire was to limit the declarations to proof of the act of the declarant only.' 1 3 The courts
soon stepped beyond this limitation, allowing inferences to be
drawn as to the actions of a third person. This extension appears
to be well established by such cases as Pheaster.1"4 But the courts
have extended Hillmon beyond this logical stopping place and
have allowed the declarant's statement to prove the action of another person when the intention of the declarant is only marginally involved, if at all. This extension is perhaps almost inevitable
given clever attorneys and courts that are unwilling to upset convictions supported by great volumes of evidence because of "minor" evidentiary rulings. Every one of the cases in this category is
an appeal of conviction in a criminal case. These dynamics have
clearly shaped the progress of the judicial process on the problem
of including the action of a third person under the Hillmon
doctrine.
V.

STATE OF MIND DECLARATIONS OF MEMORY

A.

The Pure Metal of Memory

Including the actions of third persons with the intention of
the declarant poses some risk to the hearsay rule, but that risk
appears small when compared to another trend which allows the
declaration of present state of mind to include a memory of
things past. This extension has the real potential of turning the
5
hearsay rule inside out."
112. Id.
113. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
114. For a discussion of Pheaster, see supra notes 72-81 and accompanying
text.

115. Some commentators have hailed the expansion of the state of mind
exception and the decline of the hearsay rule. See infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
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In his commentary on Hilimon, Seligman argued that if declarations of present state of mind to prove an act in the future were
to be admitted, then logically a declaration of a present state of
mind of an action occurring in the past should also be admissible. 11 6 The hearsay rule, he concluded, would thus be destroyed. 11 7 One might respond that the law of evidence need not
be logical, and in fact is not in several areas. But beyond this
rather weightless assertion, no one has seriously disputed Seligman's conclusion. Professor Maguire responded by suggesting
the second major limitation on Hillmon: that declarations not be
used to prove actions which took place in the past." t8
The necessity for maintaining a sharp distinction between
statements looking forward and statements looking backward is
made plain by an analysis of the four traditional hearsay dangers.' 19 In a statement of future intention, some potential dangers of ambiguity and insincerity are presented, but no problem
with memory or perception is encountered. 120 Certainly a declarant can perceive her own present state of mind; and because a
statement of future intention is a present state of mind by definition, no memory loss is possible. When the declarant looks backward, however, both of these dangers are encountered. The
declarant may have a faulty memory of the past state of mind.
This danger rises appreciably to the extent that the past state of
mind includes memory of external events. There is also the danger of misperception of the past events. In looking backward, ambiguity will not be a greater danger, but the hearsay danger of
insincerity is greatly magnified. A person might be insincere
about her present intention to do an act, but at least the fact
finder is always aware that unknowable future events may have
hindered the declarant's intention. In contrast, when the event
has already taken place, and the declarant is stating her preexisting state of mind, a person open to the lure of insincerity might
easily vary her "preexisting" state of mind to comport with the
actual course of circumstances.
116. See Seligman, supra note 11, at 155-56. See also supra notes 58-61 and
accompanying text.
117. Seligman, supra note 11, at 156.

118. See Maguire, supra note 2, at 715. See also supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. Hinton also cautioned against this second collision with the hearsay rule. See Hinton, supra note 42, at 422-23.
119. For a discussion of the four traditional hearsay dangers, memory, insincerity, ambiguity and perception, see Tribe, supra note 11.
120. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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Despite these added dangers, 2 1 and the warning by Seligman, in the years after Hilimon a few courts began to admit declarations which included memory of past events. 122 The inexorable
engulfment of the hearsay rule appeared to be continuing apace.
Into this milieu came the 1933 Supreme Court decision in
Shepard v. United States.' 2 3 Defendant Charles Shepard was accused of murdering his wife, Zenana, by poisoning her with
bichloride of mercury. The defense contended that Zenana had
committed suicide. The prosecution based its case on the motive
of the defendant to be rid of his wife so that he could marry another, and on the opportunity of the defendant, a medical doctor,
to gain access to the poison. 24 The defense argued that Zenana
121. Two other reasons for distinguishing between forward-looking and
backward-looking statements have been advanced. First, the causal connection
from intention to action is missing in a backward-looking statement. Second,
the jury will be able to intuit how easily an intention can be frustrated, but will
not so easily understand the risks in accepting a backward-looking statement.
See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 3, § 442, at 571.
122. The three major cases are the English case of Lloyd v. Powell Duffryn
Steam Coal Co., 1914 A.C. 733 (1914) (declaration of intention to provide home
for illegitimate child allowed to prove issue of paternity); Williams v. Kidd, 170
Cal. 631, 151 P. 1 (1915) (statements made during negotiations for sale of property allowed to disprove donative intent in delivery of deed three years earlier);
Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 P. 911 (1924) (declarations of intended delivery made some three years after deed was placed in a safe deposit box).
These cases have received much comment. Lloyd especially has been harshly
criticized. See Hinton, supra note 42, at 420-21; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the
Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 209-12 (1948); Payne,
supra note 6, at 1013; Comment, Declarations Concerning Mental State, 28 HARV. L.
REV. 299 (1915). But see Maguire, supra note 2, at 719-24 (need for care in receiving this type of evidence, but admission "practical" and not a "terrifying
prospect"). Commentators argue that Williams and Mower are less objectionable
because they involve inferences to a past state of mind instead of a past act. See
Maguire, supra note 2, at 724-27; Payne, supra note 6, at 10 13-15. These authorities argue that an inference to a past state of mind only, and not a past act, is a
supportable stopping place. The difficulty with this position is that it acts not as
a barrier but rather as a springboard for the courts to jump forward toward admission of past acts. Payne would welcome this extension. See infra note 147
and accompanying text.
123. 290 U.S. 96 (1933), rev'g 62 F.2d 683 (10th Cir.).
124. 62 F.2d at 684-85. The prosecution offered the following evidence.
The defendant left his wife at Ft. Riley, Kansas, to take a flight surgeon's course
of study at Brooks Field, Texas. He met another woman during the course, and
asked her to marry him if he could obtain a divorce. He wrote to her later that
he was depressed because his wife had made an excessive financial settlement
demand for the divorce. There was evidence that in March and April, 1929, he
obtained bichloride of mercury tablets from the dispensary, although he later
denied having done so. On May 20, 1929, he gave his wife a highball, after
which she became violently ill. He told doctors she had ingested some bad liquor. He told others she was a chronic alcoholic and had a bad heart, but no
evidence was found of those conditions. Dr. Shepard opposed an autopsy following the death on June 15, 1929. Later, he went back to Texas as soon as
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was a chronic alcoholic, that she had expressed the desire not to
live any more, and that certain physical findings were inconsistent
25
with mercury poisoning.
The evidence in question consisted of two declarations by
Zenana to the nurse who took care of her after she had become
sick. The nurse's first statement was "She said that she was being
poisoned."' 126 In response to a question calling for the exact
words, the nurse testified, "She said: 'Dr. Shepard has poisoned
me.' "127 The trial judge admitted the statements into evidence.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the statements were admissible for the purpose of showing that the victim's state of mind
was inconsistent with a suicidal motive, and thus as some rebuttal
28
of the defense of suicide.'
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the Supreme Court,
disagreed. He pointed out that the testimony was neither offered
possible, even though he had told others he was going to Denver (an interesting
comment on the Hilimon doctrine). He applied for a transfer to Ft. Sam Houston, Texas, and set a wedding date for August 30, 1929. This intention was
frustrated by his arrest for murder. Id.
125. Id. at 689. In his defense, the doctor offered the following evidence.
The victim had expressed to others a desire not to live. On the evening she was
first taken ill, the examining doctor made a diagnosis of polyneurotic alcoholic
psychosis. After she became ill, Mrs. Shepard developed trench mouth. To cure
that condition she had periodically gargled a mouthwash containing mercuric
chloride; this could have been absorbed through the membrane of the mouth in
quantities sufficient to have poisoned her. The autopsy revealed mercury
poisoning, but normally in cases of bichloride of mercury poisoning, inflammation of the kidneys is present. No such finding was made in the autopsy. Id. at
689.
126. Id. at 685.
127. Id. Evidence of the statements was first revealed during the government's rebuttal to the defense of suicide, at which point the prosecutor asked
that the evidence be stricken. This was done. The next day, after laying a foundation for the statements as dying declarations, the prosecutor put the evidence
before thejury. Although the trial court admitted the evidence as a dying declaration, both the circuit court and the Supreme Court held that the evidence was
inadmissible as a dying declaration because the prosecution had been unable to
establish the certainty of impending death. 290 U.S. at 99-102; 62 F.2d at 686.
128. 62 F.2d at 685-86. Judge Orie Phillips dissented in the circuit court
from the admission of the evidence on the state of mind theory. Id. at 686 (Phillips, J., dissenting). On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Cardozo agreed
with Judge Phillips. 290 U.S. at 105-06. Despite this agreement, there is an
interesting difference of interpretation between the two judges. Judge Phillips
depicted Mrs. Shepard as being ill and mentally confused at the time she made
the declarations (two days after being poisoned). He thought that this condition
removed any guarantees of trustworthiness from the statements. He speculated
that the statements may have been the revenge of a wife cast aside, who wished
to take her husband with her. 62 F.2d at 688 (Phillips, J. dissenting). Justice
Cardozo, in rejecting the evidence as a dying declaration, gave the following
description of Mrs. Shepard's condition two days after the event: "her mind had
cleared up, and her speech was rational and orderly." 290 U.S. at 99.
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nor received for the narrow purpose proposed: "A trial becomes
unfair if testimony thus accepted may be used in an appellate
court as though admitted for a different purpose, unavowed and
unsuspected." 129 Beyond that, he reasoned, the jury could not
separate using the evidence for the narrow purpose from using it
to prove that the defendant had in fact poisoned her. In often
quoted prose he wrote, "Discrimination so subtle is a feat beyond
the compass of ordinary minds. The reverberating clang of those
30
accusatory words would drown all weaker sounds."'
Having thus rejected the admission of the evidence, Justice
Cardozo might have ended the opinion. However, apparently
concerned by extension of the Hilimon doctrine to cover statements of past actions, he continued,
So also in suits upon insurance policies, declarations
by an insured that he intends to go upon a journey with
another, may be evidence of a state of mind lending
probability to the conclusion that the purpose was fulfilled. . . . The ruling in that case marks the high water
line beyond which courts have been unwilling to go. It
has developed a substantial body of criticism and commentary. Declarations of intention, casting light upon
the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations of memory, pointing backwards to the past.
There would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule
13
against hearsay if the distinction were ignored. '
Although this discussion is technically dictum, the directive of
Justice Cardozo is clear: admission of declarations of state of
mind must not be extended to include "declarations of memory,
pointing backwards to the past."
With Shepard, the extension of the Hilimon doctrine to include
statements of memory seemingly came to an abrupt halt. Most
courts and the drafters of evidence rules have followed the lead of
Justice Cardozo in Shepard to exclude "a statement of memory or
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed."' 132 Yet, despite
129. 290 U.S. at 103 (citing People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 200, 172
N.E. 466, 469 (1930)).
130. Id. at 104.
131. Id. at 105-06 (citing Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 297) (footnote omitted).
132. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(3); UNIF. R. EVID. 63(12) (1953) ("not including memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed") (superseded by UNIF. R. EVID. 803(3) (1980), which follows the language of the federal
rule); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250(b) (West 1966) ("[t]his section does not make
admissible evidence of a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
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this general agreement, courts soon began anew to erode the face
of the Hillmon rule by allowing declarations of memory to be admitted as present state of mind.
The first nick in Shepard appeared only five years later in Lee v.
Mitcham. 133 An orphan asylum had loaned money to one John
Bartlett. The loan was secured by deeds of trust to Bartlett's
property. Twenty-three years later, Bartlett died, leaving the debt
unpaid. The treasurer of the asylum wrote a personal check for
the outstanding amount and paid the bank. He received Bartlett's
notes, but they were marked "paid." Upon returning to his office,
the treasurer wrote on each note, "The principal and unpaid interest . . . was paid . . .to be credited to The Washington City
Orphan Asylum in order to save it from loss and not to extinguish
the note and the same is to be held by me as my property . . ."134 In a later suit by heirs of Bartlett to have the
deeds of trust released, the notes with the annotations were offered into evidence.
The issue for decision was the treasurer's intent at the time
he paid the notes: a purchaser for value or a volunteer who acquired no rights? The court pointed out that only a short lapse of
time had intervened between the payment at the bank and the
treasurer's annotation on the notes. The court cited Hilimon for
the "settled rule" that "whenever intention is of itself a distinct
and material fact in a chain of circumstances, it may be proved by
contemporaneous oral or written declarations of the party."',3 5 A
subtle transformation of the rule has occurred here. No attention
was paid to the fact that in Hilimon the statement of intention
looked entirely forward. In Lee, the important portion of the
statement looked entirely backward. Hilimon was thus stretched
to support a quite different rule. 13 6 Citation to Shepard is noticeremembered or believed"). See also MODEL

CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 513 (1942)
(excluding declaration "stating his memory or belief of a fact when offered as
tending to prove the fact remembered or believed"). Model Rule 503(2) does,
however, allow admission of such a declaration when the declarant is unavailable. See id.
For state court decisions following the Cardozo position, see State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 628 P.2d 580 (1981); People v. Hamilton, 55 Cal. 2d 881,
362 P.2d 473, 13 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1961) (en banc); City of Indianapolis v. Swanson,-. Ind. App. -, 436 N.E. 2d 1179 (1982).
133. 98 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
134. Id. at 299-300.
135. Id. at 301 (citing Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892)).
136. A short passage of time would arguably mean the hearsay danger of
memory loss would be minimal. Also, since the declaration is of a state of mind,
the danger of misperception would be small. One would think, however, that
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ably absent. Because, however, the inference backward is to a
previous state of mind instead of a previous action, the extension
13 7
of Hilimon is arguably a small one.
A subsequent extension of Hillmon to prove a past action is
more significant and troublesome. State v. Thornton 138 involved a
prosecution for murder. The prosecution contended that defendant had lured his wife to his apartment where he killed her. To
prove the inducement to go to the apartment, the state offered
the testimony of the victim's cousin. The cousin testified that the
victim talked to her on the telephone on the day of the crime and
expressed an intention to go to the defendant's apartment. So far
this is within Hillmon. The witness continued, however, and in response to a completely separate question gave evidence of a past
action. The question shows the prosecutor realized he was treading on the thin ice of hearsay, and the answer proved him right:
"Q. Don't tell us what you said. She asked you if you had seen
her husband? A. Yes, and she said he had called her all day, had
worried her about to death."'13 9 This statement involved not only
a past action but also the past action of another, the husband.
The court found no difficulty in admitting the evidence, even
though nothing in the second statement evidenced an actual intention of visiting the defendant. The court relied on cases which
allow the inclusion of any natural incidents which accompany the
expression of intention. For example, in the statement, "I am going to travel to Camden with X," the intention (to travel) comes in
on the strength of Hillmon, and the accompanying expression
(with X) comes in as a natural circumstance accompanying the
statement. 40 The difficulty with this theory, even if it were accepted, is that the statement of the defendant's actions in Thornton
the danger of insincerity would be enormous. That alone should require exclusion of the statements.
137. See supra note 122. A like case is Garford Trucking Corp. v. Mann, 163
F.2d 71 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 810 (1947). The agent of the defendant
went on an errand and deviated from the appropriate route. The question was
whether the agent had departed from the master's business to conduct his own.
Id. at 72. Statements made by the agent from his hospital bed some 10 days
after the accident were to the effect that he had taken the longer route because
he thought it faster. This state of mind was held relevant to show the agent's
intention for taking the longer route. Id. at 73-74.
138. 38 N.J. 380, 185 A.2d 9 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 816 (1963).
139. Id. at 388, 185 A.2d at 14.
140. See, e.g., Hunter v. State, 40 N.J.L. 495 (1878). The Thornton court also
justified admission of the statement as a verbal part of an act. Thornton, 38 N.J.
at 391, 185 A.2d at 15. This ground is completely inappropriate, however, since
the combined act and statement did not affect any legal rights or duties. See C.
MCCORMICK,

supra note 38, § 249, at 733.
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involves in no way the "natural incidents" of the declarant's statement of intention. All of the cases on which the court relied involved statements of intention that included the natural
circumstances in virtually the same sentence. The statement in
Thornton was separated from the intention and the precipitating
actions both in time and space.
Even with this error, Thornton might be dismissed as an unimportant misapplication of Hillmon but for additional language of
the court. Recognizing that the statements looked backward, the
court opined that "[t]he additional statements which accompanied the expression of purpose to visit Thornton and the reasons
in the very recent past which motivated the intention do not justify
limitations of the testimony to the narrow statement of the plan to
make the visit . . ."141 In this case, the state was attempting to
prove that the victim had been lured to the defendant's apartment. The entire value of the victim's statements looked backward; her intention to go to the apartment was relevant only in
the most marginal sense. All four of the hearsay dangers are
present in the victim's statement, and the leap beyond the barrier
erected by Shepard is apparent. If out of court statements of actions from the very recent past which explain the motivation for
the intention are admissible, there is no principled reason for not
admitting statements of actions from the distant past that also ex42
plain the motivation for the intention.'
Allowance of statements in the very recent past leads naturally to a case such as State v. Sharbono' 4 3 where, again, a husband
was on trial for murdering his wife. The disputed evidence was a
statement of the wife-victim to a friend that she was afraid to drive
at night and would not go on a weekend trip unless her husband
drove. Of course the evidence was offered to prove the intention
of the victim, but the true purpose was to establish the identity of
the husband. The reasoning of the court was remarkable: "when
141. 38 N.J. at 390, 185 A.2d at 15 (emphasis added).
142. The rebuttal of this argument might be that as the time period following an action lengthens, the hearsay danger of faulty memory is enhanced. Consequently, the argument would run, a statement including a recent past act
should be admitted because the loss of memory danger is small, whereas a statement including a distant past act should be excluded because the loss of memory
danger is large.
The rejoinder to this is that there is no principled stopping place between
recent and distant past events. Inevitably the lines drawn in the individual cases
will recede inexorably from the present toward the more distant past until Shepard-and the hearsay rule-are but a memory.
143. 175 Mont. 373, 563 P.2d 61 (1977).
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intent is a material element of a disputed fact, declarations of a
decedent made after as well as before an alleged act that indicate
the intent with which he performed the act are admissible . . .".,44
The court suggests that the inference backwards is
only to a prior state of mind; but clearly the state of mind in this
case was relevant only insofar as it supported an inference to the
action. The court's declaration of the "rule" is a dictum, but even
so the language is quite provocative. The danger is that the language will be divorced from the facts of the case and applied to
the next analogous factual situation. So moves the law. So recedes Shepard.
The stream of cases beginning to flow around and over the
1 45
barrier of Shepard has been hailed by some commentators.
These writers are self-avowed no friends of the hearsay rule.
They recognize that the continued extension of Hilimon will ultimately engulf the rule, and they accept that eventuality as a positive movement in the law.
The writers begin by diminishing Cardozo's opinion in Shepard. Cardozo's discussion of the dangers of "declarations of
memory, pointing backwards to the past," is devalued, if not entirely dismissed, as dictum.' 46 Yet, no one has ever disputed that
Cardozo's warning is accurate: admission of backward-looking
statements as present states of mind will lead to eventual abolition of the hearsay rule. Every memory is a present state of mind.
Nothing would be left on which the hearsay rule could operate.
Consequently, whether as dictum or holding, the danger is
identified.
144. Id. at 385, 563 P.2d at 68 (quoting Thompson v. Steinkamp, 120
Mont. 475, 481, 187 P.2d 1018, 1021 (1947)).
145. See, e.g. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 803(3)[05], at 803130; Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 43, at 298; Payne, supra note 6, at 1056-58.
146. Weinstein and Berger attempt to dispose of the crucial passage in
Shepard as dictum. See 4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 803(3)[05],
at 803-128. Louisell and Mueller argue that the opinion can be read narrowly
and suggest that declaration of a past state of mind of the declarant about his own
previous acts is not necessarily proscribed. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra
note 3, § 442, at 567-68. This argument suggests that Cardozo was being quite
careful not to decide Shepard too broadly. Id. The opinion does lend itself to a
reading that only a backward-looking declaration incorporating the act of another is prohibited. However, this reading ignores the fact that Cardozo considered Hillmon a "high water line" that has "developed a substantial body of
criticism and commentary." Shepard, 290 U.S. at 105 (citing Hillmon, 145 U.S.
285 (1892)). Followers of the Cardozo style will readily recognize sharp criticism in this apparently innocuous language. Justice Cardozo took great pains
not to criticize other court opinions. His reference to Hillmon is tantamount to a
direct expression that the case was wrongly decided, or at least that the law has
changed.
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Some commentators insist that there is no danger; instead,
there is an opportunity to rid the law of the tortured and inconsistent rule against hearsay. Payne collects the cases extending into
the past in defiance of Shepard and then urges "abandonment of
the effort to apply the conjectural and metaphysical distinctions
sometimes involved in keeping the Hillmon doctrine in its
place."1 47 He advocates a "simple" rule ofjudicial discretion for
admission of this type of evidence. Weinstein and Berger agree.
They suggest that such declarations should be controlled by the
catch-all exception to hearsay which is embodied in Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(24).148 Other commentators concur.' 4 9 Even
the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence proposed an exception for statements of recent perception, but this effort was re0
jected by Congress.15
The post-Shepard cases are illustrative of the judicial process.
A few cases depart from the general rule because the application
of the fact patterns to the rule produces a result which the court
believes is improper. Thus, a court alters the rule slightly to attain a result thought more desirable in that particular fact situation. But then other courts apply the alteration to increasingly
diverse fact situations. Soon, sympathetic commentators collect
the new cases and announce the new rule as established law. The
147. Payne, supra note 6, at 1057.
148. 4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 803(3)[05], at 803-130.
149. See, e.g., Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 43, at 289. They note the
objection that a past state of mind declaration will erode the hearsay rule, but
then point out that the hearsay rule has already been eroded by exceptions "to
which this would not greatly add." These writers fail to recognize the distinction
between another exception to the rule and an exception which contains the inevitable creation of a new rule which will turn the old rule inside out.
150. Weinstein and Berger identified the reasoning behind Congress' rejection of the proposed exception:
Rule 804(b)(2), as promulgated by the Supreme Court, was eliminated by
Congress for the following reason:
Proposed Rule 804(b)(2)
Rule 804(b)(2), a hearsay exception submitted by the Court, titled
"Statement of recent perception", read as follows:
A statement, not in response to the instigation of a person engaged in
investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates, describes,
or explains an event or condition recently perceived by the declarant,
made in good faith, not in contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in which he was interested, and while this recollection was clear.
The Committee eliminated this rule as creating a new and unwarranted
hearsay exception of great potential breadth. The Committee did not
believe that statements of the type referred to bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to justify admissibility.
4J. WEINSTEIN &M. BERGER, supra note 15, 804, at 804-09 (quoting H.R. REP.

No. 650, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973)).
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rule is then ripe for adoption in fact patterns even further
removed.
Two cases are especially illustrative of this process. In these
cases, the courts issued opinions which substantially extend the
Hillmon doctrine into the inclusion of past actions.
The first of these two decisions is People v. Newman, 15 1 where
an appellate court concurred in a dissenting judge's analysis of
the hearsay issue. The defendant had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter.15 2 On appeal, the dissenting opinion rejected
the defendant's argument that hearsay had been improperly admitted at trial. The questioned evidence consisted of statements
made by the victim shortly before he was allegedly run down by
defendant's automobile. The witness was a waitress in a latenight tavern. She testified that around 2 a.m. the victim came into
the tavern and spoke to her:
He said to me, he said, "Sandy"-and his exact wordshe said, 'do you know what that son of a bitch-'
And I said, "Who?"
He said, "Donny Newman [defendant] and John D tried
to do to me just now?"
I said, "When?"
He said, "Just a while ago."
I said, "What's that?"
He said, "He tried to run me over."
I said, "Oh, you're kidding."
He said, "No." He said, "Donny Newman and John D.
just now tried to run me over." He said, "He is trying to
53
kill me." 1
Surely this evidence, repeated twice, was enough, but the court
approved the continuation:
I said, "You're kidding." I says, "Maybe it was just an
accident."
151. 107 Mich. App. 535, 309 N.W.2d 657, app. denied, 412 Mich. 890

(1981).
152. Id. At trial, the defendant had been prosecuted for first and second
degree murder, as well as for voluntary manslaughter. The trial court instructed
the jury on the defense of accident as it related to the first two offenses, but not
the third. After the defendant was convicted of the third offense, voluntary manslaughter, the appellate court held that the failure to give the accident instruction on all counts was reversible error. Id. at 537-38, 309 N.W.2d at 657. As to
the remaining claims of error, the court found "no merit" and concurred in the
discussion of them by the dissenting judge. Id. at 538, 309 N.W.2d at 657.
153. Id. at 541, 309 N.W.2d at 659 (Bronson, P.J. dissenting).
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He said, "No." He said he had already-"He's already
been over. He told Joann [victim's wife] he's going to
54
kill me."
Apparently hearing the reverberating clang of the words at that
point, the trial court cut off the exchange. But the end did not
come before the jury had heard the victim "testify" that the defendant had tried to kill him (memory of a past event), that the
defendant was trying to kill him (a present intent, but of another
person), 55 and that the defendant had declared his intent to kill
the victim (hearsay within hearsay within hearsay).
The trial court simply admitted the evidence as reflecting on
the victim's state of mind, and the appellate court opined that the
defendant's defense of accident made the victim's state of mind
relevant.' 5 6 In suggesting that the testimony of this witness was
properly admitted, the court completely trampled Shepard in its
unthinking approval of state of mind which looks entirely backward. The extension of Hilimon by the reasoning of this caseshould it be followed by other courts-is substantial and, one
must add, unprincipled.
Gann v. Meek 157 is another case which extends Hillmon without
reasoned analysis. The litigation was between the wife and the
mother of a Marine killed in combat. Both claimed the proceeds
of his insurance policy. The wife was the named beneficiary, but
the mother contended that her son had changed the policy to
name her as the beneficiary. The jury awarded the proceeds to
the mother. The mother's evidence consisted of a letter from her
son to his brother in which he wrote, "Speaking of Mother Bud I
did change my insurance if any one gets it Mom will get it all
[sic]

. .

"158

The statement faces entirely backward to a past action. The
inapplicability of Hilimon and the warning of Shepard are directly
involved. Even so, the letter was admitted.' 59 The court recog154. Id.
155. See id. The state of mind of the victim of a crime is normally irrelevant.
This declaration is reminiscent of "Dr. Shepard is trying to poison me." Cf
supra text accompanying note 127.
156. 107 Mich. App. at 542, 309 N.W.2d at 659 (Bronson, P.J., dissenting)
(citing People v. White, 401 Mich. 482, 257 N.W.2d 912 (1977)). The majority
joined in Presiding Judge Bronson's resolution of the hearsay issue. Id. at 538,
309 N.W.2d at 657. Though the court cited White for this proposition, one must
look in vain for the promised support in that opinion.
157. 165 F.2d 857 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849 (1948).
158. Id. at 858 n.1.
159. Id. at 859. The court emphasized that the letter was genuine, which is,
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nized that the letter, by itself, was insufficient to carry the case to
the jury. Consequently, the court looked to other evidence. A
corporal who had served with the deceased testified that the mail
service in the South Pacific during the war was irregular and loss
of mail was frequent. The court also took judicial notice that mail
piled up in the office of the Veterans Administration and that
eventually many letters were misplaced or lost. The inference,
thought the court, was that the deceased's letter containing the
change of beneficiary was lost. This was the total of the evidence.
Holding that the evidence was "abundant" to show that the soldier had done all he could to change the beneficiaries, the court
concluded that "justice requires that we invoke equitable rules in
60
order to give effect to a plainly manifest intent."'
We lay aside the evidence of the difficulties in mail service as
of little or no value. What remains is a letter in which the insured
states that he had changed his beneficiary. To prove the change
in beneficiary, the letter is plainly hearsay. Nevertheless, with a
citation to Hilimon and a passing reference that the letter "almost" amounted to a dying declaration, the court admitted the
evidence.' 6 ' Of course the letter looked entirely backward. The
hearsay dangers of ambiguity and misperception are present.
The insured's actions may have been legally insufficient to change
the beneficiary. In addition, the danger of insincerity looms large
in view of other portions of the letter which refer to revelations
apparently made about the wife in the brother's prior letter. The
danger of loss of memory is substantial under the circumstances
of a wartime combat zone. At least three, if not all four, hearsay
dangers are present. Certainly the Hillmon doctrine furnishes no
basis for admitting the evidence, as Hillmon requires an intention
to do an act in the future. The admonition of Shepard against admitting statements which call up past action applies. The declaration is entirely backward-facing. No support in reason or
precedent can be found for the result.
These two cases-Newman and Gann-represent the outer
of course, irrelevant to the hearsay question. The court also suggested that admission of the letter was stipulated, although it then proceeded to determine
whether the letter was admissible. See id.
160. Id. Perhaps one could explain the court's result by assuming that it was
analogizing to will cases. Both forward- and backward-looking statements of
mind have been admitted to determine the intent of the testator in will contests.
See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text. A court disposed to find for the
mother against a war bride may have found the analogy persuasive, although the
opinion does not mention this line of reasoning.
161. 165 F.2d at 859-60 (citing Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892)).
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limits of the extension of Hillmon. Indeed, if Newman and Gann
are good law, then Hillmon has been extended to the point at
which the hearsay rule has passed from the scene. Such a result
would be highly ironic, for Cardozo was the judge who warned
against this course in Shepard. Cardozo was aware of the trend of
the decisions following Hillmon. Not afraid to make new law, he
was savvy enough to dress major changes in the law with cloak162
ings of mere adjustments to existing, well-accepted rules.
Surely he must have seen the opportunity to reach into Hilimon
and turn the hearsay rule-cloaked as a mere minor extension of
the state of mind exception-into something structurally different. Cardozo not only refused the opportunity but added a dictum to his opinion in Shepard which flatly rejected it.
For five decades, the mighty weight of Cardozo helped preserve the rule against admission of backward-looking statements
under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. Yet even if
we dismiss Newman and Gann as badly decided and ill-considered
opinions, additional cracks have appeared in the Shepard dike.
Some have appeared by way of inadvertence, and others by conscious choice, as the discussion in this section indicates. As courts
and commentators stand before the dike today and ponder
whether to insert their fingers, they must realize that the vitality of
the hearsay rule is at stake. If the rule is to be preserved, and not
turned into a matter of judicial discretion, the courts must be
more viligant in applying the state of mind exception. Furthermore, the exception should be limited to admitting forward-looking intentions. Such a course for the stream of the judicial
process would allow admission of the intention in the bulk of
cases in which it is thought necessary but at the same time preserve the hearsay rule itself.
B.

Annunziato: The Alloy of Memory and Intention

In contrast to Justice Cardozo's solicitousness for the hearsay
rule is another judicial giant's willingness to weaken the rule.
Judge Henry Friendly wrote the opinion for the Second Circuit in
United States v. Annunziato,163 where the court admitted evidence of
162. The best example is his seminal products liability opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Judge Cardozo
reached into the inherently dangerous exception to the rule requiring an injured
party to be in privity with the manufacturer, and pulled out the modern law of
products liability.
163. 293 F.2d 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961).
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a previous action when it was coupled with a present intention to
do an act in the future.
Salvatore Annunziato, a union official, was charged with accepting bribes from a contractor for which his engineers were
working. The bribes allegedly came from the president of the
contractor, Harry Terker. Harry Terker was deceased by the time
of the trial. To prove the passing of the money, the government
called Richard Terker, the son of the deceased president, and
himself the secretary-treasurer of the corporation. Richard
Terker testified to a luncheon conversation he had had with his
father:
The father informed the son "that he had received a call
from Mr. Annunziato" and "that he had been requested
by Mr. Annunziato for some money on the particular
project in question, the Bridgeport Harbor Bridge. I
asked him what he intended to do, and he had agreed to
164
send some up to Connecticut for him."'
The defendant objected to the statement on the ground that it
was hearsay. The trial court allowed the evidence as an admission
by a coconspirator. 165 Judge Friendly approved admitting the evidence on this theory, but before taking up discussion of that
ground, he chose to explore an alternate basis for admission: the
exception for a state of mind to do an act begun in Hilimon. Judge
Friendly's argument, as always, is scholarly, subtle, and suasive.
In this case, however, the analysis cannot be sanctioned.
The discussion begins by hypothesizing that if the envelope
with the money had popped out of Harry Terker's pocket and he
had said, "this is money I'm sending up to Annunziato," the statement would be admissible under Hillmon as future intention. The
opinion then asks rhetorically whether "a different result is demanded because here the declarant accompanied his statement of
future plan with an altogether natural explanation of the reason,
in the very recent past, that had prompted it."166
Conjuring up statements of what Harry Terker might have
said is ultimately unproductive. Hypothetical statements can be
concocted to fit within almost any exception to the hearsay
rule. 167 An analyst must also question the court's characteriza164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 376.
Id. at 377.
Id.
If Terker had said, "This money that I skimmed from the profits I am
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tion of the statement as merely embodying a natural explanation
of the reason for the intention. Close examination reveals that
the testimony of the witness Richard Terker does not contain a
"statement" at all. Rather, Terker is paraphrasing the conversation. The statement of intention to meet might well have been far
separated in the conversation from the statements of "explanation" for the intention.
Leaving aside these threshold objections to the analysis, we
proceed to the crux of the argument in Annunziato. After distinguishing Shepard as a case in which the testimony faced entirely
backward, the discussion in Annunziato concludes as follows:
Here the "most obvious implications" of Harry Terker's
statement looked forward-he was going to send money
to Bridgeport. To say that this portion of his statement
is sufficiently trustworthy for the jury to consider without
confrontation, but that his reference to the telephone
call from Annunziato which produced the decision to
send money is not, would truly be swallowing the camel
and straining the gnat. . . . True, inclusion of a past
event motivating the plan adds the hazards of defective
perception and memory to that of prevarication; but this
does not demand exclusion or even excision, at least
when, as here, the event is recent, is within the personal
knowledge of the declarant and is so integrally included
in the declaration of design as to make it unlikely in the
last degree that the latter would be true and the former
false. True, also, the statement of the past event would
not be admitted if it stood alone, as the Shepard case
holds; but this would not be the only hearsay exception
where the pure metal may carry some alloy along with
it. 168

The basic premise of Judge Friendly's analysis is that the statement is primarily forward-looking. The pure metal carries with it
some alloy.
On no basis can the statement be characterized as primarily
sending to Annunziato," the statement would be a declaration against interest.
See FED. R. EVID. 804(3). If Terker had accidentally dropped the envelope, and
exclaimed in the cant of the construction industry, "Goodness gracious, that is
the bribe for Annunziato; don't look!", that would be admitted as an excited
utterance. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2). Such exercises are fruitless, for the "if" at
the beginning of each sentence betrays the effort.
168. Annunziato, 293 F.2d at 377-78 (footnote omitted).
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forward-looking. The events described in Terker's statement may
be parsed into three sections: 1) the declarant received a telephone call; 2) Annunziato asked for money; and 3) the declarant
agreed to send money to him. Two of these three events face
toward the past. The same result is reached when one looks to
the purpose of the evidence in the government's case. The statement of intention to send money to Annunziato was completely
meaningless. It was other evidence which linked a delivery of
money to Annunziato. Only the backward-looking portion of the
declaration held the vein of value. The relevance of Terker's
statement was to tie Annunziato to a bribe request. This faced
entirely to the past. Finally, inspection of the statement shows
that even the statement of "intention" does not face forward.
The statement is that Terker "had agreed" to send money. Only
by inference from this prior agreement can an intention to send
the money be found. In light of this analysis, a more accurate
metaphor for the statement would be that the ton of base metal is
carried in by the ounce of gold-or iron pyrite-found within it.
At the time it was decided, Annunziato appeared to pose real
danger to the hearsay rule. Granted, the case applies only if the
declaration of past action is coupled with a declaration of future
intent, but litigants and courts can often find whatever they are
seeking in a given statement. More than a score of years has now
passed, however, and the danger seems to have been overestimated. Courts and commentators have given the Annunziato rationale a mixed reception. Judge Weinstein and Professor
Berger, no friends of the hearsay rule, have been the strongest
critics of Annunziato. They reject its basic premise that the statement in its "most obvious implications" looked forward. 16 9 A recent student note exploring the limits of the Hillmon doctrine
agrees. 7 0 Professor Saltzburg calls the decision "disturbing" and
169. 4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 803(3)[05], at 803-119.
These authors reason as follows:
The difficulty with the conclusion in Annunziato is that the evidence
was much more powerful and probative in looking backwards-to show
that the defendant had requested the payment as a bribe-than in looking forward. The elephant of the past is pulled in by the tail of the
future.
Id. (footnote omitted).
170. See Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) and the Criminal Defendant: The
Limits of the Hillmon Doctrine, 35 VAND. L. REV. 659, 697 (1982) ("The Annunziato
With
decision extended the Hillmon doctrine beyond its intended scope ....
his disarming language Judge Friendly deflected attention from the significant
departure that Annunziato made from the Shepard limitation.").
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approves a case criticizing Annunziato.17 1 Professors Louisell and
Mueller have approved the decision, although-significantlythey developed their own rationale supporting the result. 17 2 The
courts, too, have shown an ambivalence about accepting the Annunziato doctrine. Surprisingly few decisions exist. Of the many
cases citing Annunziato, most refer to the discussions of an admission by a coconspirator, a declaration against penal interest, the
production of a document under the Jencks Act,' 7 3 or a nonverbal
part of an act. 174 Few reported decisions have discussed the admissibility of a statement containing both backward-looking and
171. Saltzburg, supra note 51, at 1054 n.165. The case approved by Professor Saltzburg is United States v. Mandel, 437 F. Supp. 262 (D. Md. 1977)
(mem.), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), afd,
602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980). For a
discussion of Mandel, see infra note 174.
172. 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 3, § 442, at 572-76. Professors Louisell and Mueller advance a five-fold rationale to support the results in
Hillmon and Annunziato. Id. They argue that in both cases the results follow from
"application of the principles of trustworthiness and necessity which underlie
hearsay exceptions." Id. at 574-75. They note that in both cases: 1) the declarant made the statement "to a person obviously close and trusted. . . on a serious matter under circumstances suggesting no motive to misrepresent"; 2) the
declarant stated an intent "to embark upon a particular course of action for a
specific reason"; 3) the declarant described an immediate course of action of a
serious nature"; 4) the matter had been personally observed recently; and 5) the
declarant had died or disappeared. Id. at 575-76.
This argument makes sense, but the fallacy is that it is dependent on the
individual fact situations of the two cases. The hearsay exception announced in
Hillmon and expanded in Annunziato is not tied so tightly to these five qualifying
principles. Instead, the exception is established as rule of law and the courts are
set free to match the facts of later cases to the rule without regard to these careful limitations and cautions. Courts seek out the kernels of earlier cases, not the
excess baggage of cautions to application. Thus, the argument fails because
hearsay exceptions must be based on principles of necessity and trustworthiness
which are applicable to the class of cases falling under the exception, not to the
facts of one or two cases. See supra notes 42 & 61 and accompanying text.
173. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982). TheJencks Act concerns demands for production of statements and reports of witnesses in federal criminal prosecutions.
See id.
174. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (declarations against
pecuniary or proprietary interest are traditionally thought to be inherently reliable because motivated by extraneous considerations); United States v. Overshorn, 494 F.2d 894 (8th Cir. 1974) (hearsay statements made by coconspirator
out of presence of the accused which seemed to inculpate declarant are admissible); United States v. Glasser, 443 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1971) (note found by shopowner after plate-glass window was destroyed was admissible as an utterance
contemporaneous with a nonverbal act of throwing acid on the window); United
States v. Crisona, 416 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1969) (erroneous ruling of trial court
that tapes of telephone conversations were not required to be produced under
the Jencks Act was not reversible error where tapes contained nothing that
would have been additionally useful to defense); United States v. Dinaldi, 393
F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968) (statements by any member of an illegal joint enterprise
are admissible against the others).
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forward-looking portions, and not all of these cases cite Annunziato. To date, three courts have announced opposition to the
rationale articulated in Annunziato, and five courts have adopted it.
Of the three cases disapproving Annunziato, two rejected the
state of mind theory, but went on to admit the declaration as an
admission of a coconspirator, the alternate ground for admission
in Annunziato.i 7 5 The third case, also involving a bribery prosecution, rejected the Annunziato rationale, in part because no necessity was shown, but primarily because "if testimony of this
character is received, it could open the door for widespread
fabrication." i76

Five cases have approved and applied the extension of
Hillmon which was first expressed in Annunziato.177 A straightforward application of the past-future state of mind dichotomy was
accomplished in Smith v. Slifer.178 The declarant was killed in an
automobile accident allegedly caused by the negligence of her
driver. The plaintiff offered three statements to show an agree175. United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 136 (2d Cir. 1982) (declarant reported intent to offer one-half of commissions to defendant if he secured
town's insurance business as agreed; rejected as past act under rule 803(3), but
admitted as admission by coconspirator), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983);
United States v. Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554, 559 (E.D.N.Y.) (Judge Weinstein
commented that Annunziato "probably went beyond the limits of Rule 803(3),"
on the state of mind exception, but then allowed admission of the statement on
other grounds), aftd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041
(1977).
176. United States v. Mandel, 437 F. Supp. 262, 266 (D. Md. 1977) (mem.),
afd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), afd, 602 F.2d
653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980). The trial judge
spoke of his experience in trying cases involving a charge of aiding and abetting
the operation of a moonshine still. He noted that the usual defense includes an
offer to produce witnesses who will say that defendant told them of his intent to
go rabbit hunting. The defendant then will claim that while hunting he stumbled onto the still. The possibility of fabrication is clear.
Also clear is the wide opening for fabrication to a person who is aware of
this exception to the hearsay rule. Any self-serving statement looking to the past
can be coupled with a future intent to allow the entire statement to be admitted.
For example, assume a person is injured on his own time, but would be covered
by workers' compensation had the injury occurred on the job. Could not the
person tell his wife, "I hurt myself on the job today, so I will have to file a workers' compensation claim"? This would be a complete fabrication, but it would
be admissible under Annunziato.
177. See infra notes 178-89 and accompanying text. A sixth case is United
States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977). In this case, Judge Friendly
had an opportunity to elaborate on the Annunziato doctrine, but declined to do
so since the statement was admissible under the admission by a coconspirator
exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 1299-300. A footnote does cite Annunziato,
but then leaves "the argument as to the state of mind exception to another day."
Id. at 1298 n.1.
178. 1 Cal. App. 3d 748, 81 Cal. Rptr. 871 (1969).
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ment to share expenses of the ride in order to remove the case
from the guest statute. The trial court excluded the statements
and the plaintiff appealed. Declaration one was that defendant
had run out of gas but it was not the declarant's fault as she had
already paid for her ride that week. Since this statement faced
entirely toward the past, the appellate court ruled it was properly
excluded. Declaration two was that decedent would have to get
change to pay defendant for her ride the next week. This statement looked entirely toward the future, and was admitted. Declaration three was that declarant had been required to pay for
parking but could take it from the amount owed for the following
week. This was the Annunziato statement, and the court ordered it
admitted. 179
A like result was reached by a South Dakota court in Johnson
v. Skelly Oil Co. 180 The deceased's statement was offered to prove
that she was performing duties for her employer at the time of her
injury, so that workers' compensation benefits would be awarded.
Her statement to her husband was that she had run out of stamps
at work Friday, so she would mail the letters she brought home
from work on Monday morning. She was seriously injured in an
accident on Monday. The court approved admission of the evidence, citing Hilimon and Annunziato, 18 1 and affirmed the judgment that declarant had been injured while performing a workrelated task.
These two cases reveal one of the seductive characteristics of
the Annunziato rule. It is easy to apply. If a court can find a statement of intention in the declaration, the entire declaration rides
into evidence. While ease of application is often a positive feature
for a rule of law, it does not seem substantial enough in this instance to outweigh the possibilities of fabrication inherent in the
exception.

82

Three recent cases show the continued expansion of the exception. The first of these is Brown v. Tard.183 In a prosecution
179. Id. at 754, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 875. The Smith court did not cite
Annunziato.
180. 288 N.W.2d 493 (S.D. 1980). The state evidence rule in question was
identical to rule 803(3). Compare FED. R. EvID. 803(3) with S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 19-16-7 (1979).
181. Id. at 494.
182. See supra note 176.
183. 552 F. Supp. 1341 (D.N.J. 1982). Curiously, Brown cites a number of
important state of mind cases, but not Annunziato. See id. at 1352 (citing United
States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1982); United State v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d
840 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978); United States v. Pheaster, 544
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for murder, the state offered the declaration of the victim that
"[s]he had 'run into one of the guys in the building, the maintenance guys, and that he was going to come up to fix the air conditioner.' 184 As discussed earlier, this statement involves the
action of another person and the intention is not even that of the
declarant.1 8 5 Even if we stretch the statement to find that the declarant's intention to meet the maintenance man is implied, the
entire material value of the statement is contained in the portion
which recites the past action. The state was attempting to prove
the identity of the perpetrator, and the statement implicates the
defendant only in its backward-facing aspects. To say that the
forward-looking portion carries in this backward-facing portion
seems truly to be "swallowing the camel and straining at the
gnat."

186

The rubber tree of the past was also carried in by the ant of
the future in People v. Malizia.18 7 The state was attempting to
prove the identity of the defendant as the person who shot and
killed the victim-declarant. The declaration was that the victim
owed the defendant money, he wanted to pay, he had received
money to make a drug deal, and he was going to see if the defendant had any drugs. Here, at least, the portion identifying the defendant is found in the forward-looking portions of the statement.
Yet the court fell into error when it faced the defendant's objections that the statement of intention implicated the act of another.
In responding to that argument, the court noted that even if all
reference to the victim's intent to meet the defendant were deleted, the acknowledgement of the debt to defendant would nevertheless support the inference that the victim was going to meet
the defendant. 188 That is so, but the removal of the intention portion of the statement subtly removed all bases for admitting the
statement. This problem went unnoticed.
One court extended Annunziato so far that it appears to have
eliminated the requirement for a forward-looking portion of the
declaration. The declarant in State v. Cugliata'8 9 was a small-time
criminal, soon to become a murder victim. He made two declaraF.2d 353
omitted).
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977)) (other citations
Id. at 1350-51.
See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
Annunziato, 293 F.2d at 378.
92 A.D.2d 154, 460 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1983).
Id. at 161-62, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
372 A.2d 1019 (Me.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1977).
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tions. In the first, he told a witness about arrangements to make a
hashish purchase, and that he intended to go with two people,
one of whom was named Frank (the name of one of the defendants). The court admitted this declaration over the objection that
it included the action of others.' 9 0 The other declaration was a
written note, in which the victim said, "Split with John Meraides
(or Miraides) and Frank Cogliata at 9:00 p.m. 14th of August. In
case of no return check them for responsibility carrying $2000.00
[sic]."''
The second sentence of direct accusation of the defendants by the deceased declarant was tastefully excised by the court,
but the first sentence was submitted to the jury. Over the defendants' hearsay objection that the note recited past events, the court
gingerly placed both declarations together, cited Annunziato, and
said "While there are minor references therein to the past, the
assertions in essence look forward rather than back."' 192 This interpretation of Annunziato is at least arguable as to the conversation with the witness. It is completely unsupportable as to the
note. The note looks entirely backward.
As with the Hilimon case itself, the Annunziato decision not
only greatly expands the state of mind exception to the hearsay
rule but also is susceptible to elastic application. Judge Friendly
did attempt to limit his opinion by requiring: 1) the statement
must be recent; 2) the statement must be within the personal
knowledge of the declarant; and 3) the past event must be so integrally included in the intention a~s to make it highly unlikely that
the former is false though the latter is true.' 93 As one might expect, these limitations do not appear in the later cases applying
Annunziato.
To a judge searching the precedents for guidance in making
a decision, the principle of the case is the thing. This allows the
law to grow, but it also results in applications of the principle to
cases where application is unwarranted. 19 4 Rarely doubting the
wisdom of the precedential rule, the successor courts apply the
principle to fact situations further and further removed from
190. Id. at 1028-29. See supra note 92.
191. 372 A.2d at 1026.

192. Id. at 1027 n.4.
193. Annunzialo, 293 F.2d at 378.
194. "Each [rule] has its origin in a justifiable holding in a particular fact
situation. By lazy repetition the holding becomes a 'rule,' entirely divorced from

its creative facts." McKinney v. Yelavich, 352 Mich. 687, 696, 90 N.W.2d 883,
887 (1958).
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those which initially gave the principle life. This is both the genius and the glibness of the judicial process.

VI.

ADDITIONAL EXPANSIONS OF HILLMON

Other expansions of the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule are not well established. The most defensible of these
allows admission of a testator's declaration concerning her past
intent in writing, executing, or revoking a will. 1 9 5 Even though

this special exception allows statements of past intent as well as
pure statements of future intention, thus running afoul of the caution in Shepard, the courts have uniformly admitted such statements because of the special necessity for receiving them. 19 6 The
testamentary intent is known only by the testator, and by definition, she is unavailable.
Creation of this special class of admissible evidence is objectionable on logical grounds, but no argument will be made here
as the law is solidly established. The courts should, however, be
vigilant not to extend this rule beyond the narrow situation involving a will. Some courts have not been sufficiently vigilant.
One court mentioned this line of cases, and then admitted into
evidence a declaration by the decedent to "show that he had in
fact executed a contract to make a will at some time in the
past." 9 7 Another court approved the admission of a letter from a
Marine killed in action which stated that he had changed the beneficiary on his life insurance policy.19 8 These cases resemble the
195. See FED. R. EvID. 803(3). Rule 802(3) provides the state of mind hearsay exception, excepts statements of memory, then provides an exception to the
exception to the exception for will cases:
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion,
sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design,
mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement
of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it
relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will [is not excluded by the hearsay rule].
Id.
196. The cases are uniform, beginning with Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards, 1
C.P.D. 154 (1876). Commentators have approved the group of cases as a class.
See, e.g., 4 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 3, § 443, at 385; C. McCoRMICK, supra note 38, § 296, at 853; 4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15,

803(3) [05], at 803-121; Slough, Spontaneous Statements and State of Mind, 46 IowA
L. REV. 224, 238 (1961). Arguably the transgression of Shepard in these cases is
insignificant because the evidence looks to a prior state of mind, not to a prior
act. For a discussion of this issue, see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
197. Quayle v. Mackert, 92 Idaho 563, 568, 447 P.2d 679, 684 (1968).
198. Gann v. Meek, 165 F.2d 857 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849
(1948). This case is dicussed supra at notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
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will cases, but closer scrutiny reveals that they leave the door
open to admitting hearsay declarations in any case involving the
disposition of property by a person now deceased. This would be
a further expansion of the exception, and cannot be justified in
view of the intrusion of the possibility of memory loss and the
greater possibilities for insincerity and fabrication.
One article goes so far as to suggest that the exception
should be broadened to include nontestamentary cases by analogy to these will cases.19 9 The article recognizes that the hearsay
rule would be broken down, but dismisses this difficulty by pointing out that there are already several exceptions to the rule. 200
Fortunately, in the fifty years since the article was written, no additional support for that position has appeared.
Since the will cases represent a special dispensation from the
logic of the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, we ought
to be able to expect the courts to take care to keep that line of
cases on the straight and narrow. Perhaps the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), which specifically limits the exception, will have the desired narrowing effect. 20 1
Statements referring to past events are also admitted under
the state of mind exception when defenses of self-defense, suicide, or accidental death are raised, on the theory that expressions of fear of the accused rebut such defenses. 20 2 Like the will
cases, there is the potential for unwarranted expansion of this line
of cases, as demonstrated by one notable California case 20 3 in
which the court extrapolated that the victim's fear of the defendant was relevant to the defendant's intent to harm the victim.
199. See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 43, at 298. These commentators
do reserve a large measure of discretion in the trial judge to exclude "remote
and suspicious statements." Id. at 298 n.59.
200. Id. at 289-90.
201. See supra note 195.
202. The cases supporting these rules have solidified from repeated balancing by the courts of the prejudice of the evidence against its probative value.
They are collected in United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 767-69 (D.C. Cir.
1974); see also 4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 803(3)[04], at 803108 to -110; Slough, supra note 192, at 235-36.
203. See People v. Merkouris, 52 Cal. 2d 672, 344 P.2d 1 (1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 943 (1960). In Merkouris, the California Supreme Court allowed the
victim's declaration of fear of the defendant to weigh on the "probability that
the fear had been aroused by the victims' knowledge of the conduct of defendant
indicating his intent to harm them ...... Id. at 682, 344 P.2d at 6. Clearly, this
allowed the declarant to state the intent of the defendant. Other state courts
have allowed similar statements, which prompted a federal court to say that the
opinions show "various errors in reasoning or [a] simple lack of concern."
United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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However, that case has been rejected by the California Evidence
Code,20 4 commentators, 2 0 5 and other, recent cases in which similar arguments were presented.2 0 6 At least for the present, these
lines of cases seem safely bound, although enterprising attorneys
continue to press expansion of the hearsay rule when opportune
to their clients. 20 7 A court which is not careful to reason the hearsay analysis may again start the attack on the hearsay rule from
this quarter.
Various commentators have advocated additional expansions
of the state of mind exception, but without case support. After
mentioning cases involving the intent of an insured, and by analogy to the will cases, Weinstein and Berger suggest that there is
as much special need for the statement of a deceased insured as
there is for the statement of a deceased testator. Consequently,
they argue for the creation of a similar exception. 20 The other
arguments are more ephemeral. Payne has argued for a rule of
straight discretion on the part of the trial judge when hearsay
state of mind evidence is presented. 20 9 Weinstein and Berger
have also advocated increased use of the catch-all exceptions allowed by the Federal Rules of Evidence to admit a greater
21 0
number of "trustworthy" statements.
These latter expansionary pressures have not as yet borne
fruit. One cannot but expect that some day in the near future, an
appropriate fact pattern will come before a court sympathetic to
these arguments, and new impetus will be imparted to the undercutting of the hearsay rule through the use of the state of mind
exception set in motion by Hilimon.
204. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1250 advisory committee note (West 1966).
205. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 51, at 426-27.
206. The leading case is United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir.
1973). See also United States v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1980); State v.
Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 628 P.2d 580 (1981).
207. In Brown, the prosecution offered and the trial court permitted the following testimony:
Q You mentiond, Mrs. Parks, that [the victim] was frightened. What
was he frightened of?
A: Frightened that he may be killed.
Q And who did he say he was frightened was going to kill him?
A: Mr. Roland Brown [defendant].
490 F.2d at 762. The appellate court reversed. Id. at 782.
208. 4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 803(3)[05], at 803-122.
209. See Payne, supra note 6, at 1057. Accord Weinstein, Symposium-Hearsay
Evidence: ProbativeForce of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 338 (1961).
210. See 4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 15, 803(3)[05], at 803115. Cf 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 3, § 442, at 581.
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AVAILABLE MEN SHOULD TELL

No

TALES

Some exceptions to the hearsay rule require that the declarant be unavailable to testify at the trial, while other exceptions
allow the declaration to come into evidence without regard to the
availability of the declarant. 2 1 ' The Hilimon doctrine has always
been classed with the latter, larger group of exceptions. 21 2 This is
so despite the fact that the declarant Walters was either dead or
missing in the Hilimon case itself.21 3 This section develops the argument that the Hilimon doctrine should be conditioned on the
unavailability of the declarant.
Hearsay is a declaration made out-of-court which is offered
for the truth of the matter asserted in the declaration. 2 14 It depends on the credibility of the out-of-court declarant, and so is
objectionable because the jury is unable to observe the witness
being cross-examined under oath. 21 5 Exceptions to the ban of
the hearsay rule have been created for situations which provide a
combination of necessity and reliability which the courts regard as
an adequate substitute for the information conveyed to jurors by
in-court witnesses. 21 6 The more important of these two considerations is the reliability or trustworthiness of the circumstances
surrounding the declaration, with less consideration given to the
2 17
necessity for receiving the evidence.
Necessity for receiving the evidence exists when the Hillmon
declarant is unavailable. Does necessity exist when the declarant
may be called to the stand to testify to the act inferred from the
intention? Some commentators and courts have argued that necessity exists because the hearsay testimony is more reliable than
the declarant's later testimony from the witness stand of his prior
state of mind. 21 8 Memory of an earlier state of mind might suffer
211. Compare FED. R. EVID. 803 (availability of declarant immaterial) with
FED. R. EvID. 804 (declarant must be unavailable).
212. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
214. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
215. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 38, § 245, at 583;J. WIGMORE, supra note 3,
§ 1362, at 3-10.
216. J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1420, at 251-53.
217. Cf. FED. R. EvID. 803, 804 advisory committee comments;J. WIGMORE,
supra note 3, §§ 1420-1422, at 251-55.
218. J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1714, at 90-91. This view apparently derives from the Hilimon opinion, which pointed out that after the death of the
declarant there can be no other way of proving his intention, and proceeded to
say,
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from both memory loss and insincerity. But, of course, a Hillmontype statement is not offered to prove the earlier intention. It is
offered only for the inference that the intended action later was
accomplished. 21 9 The fact to be proved is the subsequent act.
Given the ever-present possibility of frustration of intention, the
reliability of an intention to prove an act can hardly be of equal
weight to the testimony of the actor that the act was
2 20
undertaken.
The real necessity for this exception arises when the declarant is unavailable. 221 When the declarant is available, the neces22 2
sity for receiving the out-of-court declaration vanishes.
If the act be in issue, and the declarant be available, the proponent of the evidence will have testimony to support the act.
Other evidence in the form of witnesses to the act is likely to be at
hand. One cannot argue there was necessity on the facts of the
Hillmon case, and conclude therefore, that necessity exists for this
exception. There was no real necessity for the evidence on the
individual facts of Hillmon;22 3 but even if there had been, the necessity for a hearsay exception must arise from the inherent nature of a situation as an archetype, not from the unique facts of a
[W]hile he is still alive, his own memory of his state of mind at a former
time is no more likely to be clear and true than a bystander's recollection of what he then said, and is less trustworthy than letters written by
him at the very time and under circumstances precluding a suspicion of
misrepresentation.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295 (1892). See also Oberman v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 507 F.2d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
219. See supra text accompanying note 26.
220. Reduced inherent reliability would appear to place the Hilimon doctrine closer to the unavailability required exceptions collected in rule 804 than
to the availability irrelevant exceptions collected in rule 803:
[A] hearsay statement falling within one of [rule 803's] exceptions possesses qualities which justify the conclusion that whether the declarant
is available or unavailable is not a relevant factor in determining admissibility. The instant rule proceeds upon a different theory: hearsay
which admittedly is not equal in quality to testimony of the declarant on
the stand may nevertheless be admitted if the declarant is unavailable
and if his statement meets a specified standard.
FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee comment.
221. See Seligman, supra note 11, at 155-58. Cf Hutchins & Sleisinger, supra
note 43, at 285.
222. Professors Louisell and Mueller point out that when conduct of a person is at issue, "It simply will not do to say that his prior statement of intent is
likely to be better evidence of conduct than his own letter testimonial recollection of that conduct ....... 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 3, § 442, at
542.
223. Contrary to popular belief, see, e.g., Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note
43, at 288, a plethora of evidence was available and was presented by both sides
in the Hillmon litigation. See supra notes 18-19 & 42.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985

57

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 1

58

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30: p. 1

single case. 2 24 In situations involving the use of a statement of
intention to prove a later action, the probabilities are that other
evidence will be available, and that the other evidence will be
more reliable because the witnesses will be in court before the
jury.
The lack of reliability of a Hillmon-type statement when the
declarant is available also points to a requirement of unavailability for this hearsay exception. This is so whether the witness is a
person who heard the declaration or the declarant herself.
Should the witness be the declarant, the danger of fabrication
looms large. 22 5 A witness could recall stating whatever intention
convenience requires that he possessed. The only purpose would
be corroboration of the witness' testimony that the act later took
place. In effect, the witness is allowed to make a prior consistent
statement. This defeats the carefully-drawn compromise for admission of a prior statement of a witness found in Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d). That rule takes a middle ground and allows
prior statements of witnesses only under specific conditions. 22 6
Allowing the admission of prior statements of intent by an available declarant would seriously erode this rule:
The situation is little improved when the witness is a companion of the declarant. When the declarant has become unavailable, the circumstances surrounding the statement are most likely
to have been relatively trustworthy. Hilimon is a good example.
In Hilimon and the other cases, the ultimate action, usually becoming the victim of a murder, was not anticipated. In effect, the
statement was made before any motive to falsify arose.2 27 On the
224. See supra note 42.
225. Two commentators say that when the witness is available, she will always be asked about the act rather than an earlier declaration of intention, and
so the danger is only theoretical. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 51, at
429. This view misses the possibility of use of the declaration to corroborate the
testimony of the act. See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
226. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d). Rule 801(d) provides in pertinent part that a
statement is not hearsay if:
(1)

Priorstatement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hear-

ing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and
the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given
under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with his testimony and
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification
of a person made after perceiving him . ...
Id.
227. Cf Great Am. Indem. Co. v. McCaskill, 240 F.2d 80, 82-83 (5th Cir.
1957) (statements of intent to travel made to family or associates are trustworthy
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other hand, when the declarant is available, the guarantee of
trustworthiness provided by this unanticipated turn of events is
2 28
missing. The witness may well have been an accomplice.
This danger of insincerity is so large that the statement
should be excluded if the declarant remains available. Two cases
in which Hilimon statements were offered even though the declarant remained available illustrate this danger. Both involved criminal prosecutions in which the defendants offered their own prior
declarations of intent to exonerate themselves. 22 9 The defendant
in each case offered a declaration of intent to show an innocent
purpose for going to the crime scene. Given that one who
premeditates a crime would likely wish to cover his tracks, it
seems that a logical method for so doing would be to tell other
persons a false reason for an intended act. If someone wished to
commit a murder and later explain the occurrence as an accident,
telling another person an innocent purpose for going to see a victim would be expected.
These cases suggest that a statement of intention is made
under trustworthy circumstances when the declarant is surprised
by later events, but not when the later events are anticipated.
This would be a unique requirement for a hearsay exception, but
what it amounts to in practical terms is that the declarant has become unavailable, 23 0 likely as a result of the events. If the declarbecause made before motive to fabricate arises). The events in these situations,
in a sense, have proved the declaration of intention to be against the declarant's
interest.
228. The statement would not be an admission by a coconspirator since it
would not be offered against that party. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E).
229. State v. Young, 119 Mo. 495, 24 S.W. 1038 (1894) (charge of murder;
defendant offered prior stated intention to visit victim's home to pick up his
clothes); Williams v. State, 112 Tex. Crim. 482, 17 S.W.2d 1057 (1929) (charge
of manufacturing intoxicating liquor; defendant offered prior stated intention to
go to home of an acquaintance; evidence showed he encountered a still on the
way).
A like analysis applies to United States v. Williams, 704 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 481 (1983). In Williams, the defendant alleged that the
money found on his person had been intended for payment of taxes. Two
months before, the defendant had told an IRS agent that if his mother were able
to sell her house, he would bring the $3,300 owed in back taxes. Surely no one
would accept this "check is in the mail" type of declaration as reliable. The
court was forced to resort to a relevance rationale to keep this evidence from the
jury. 704 F.2d at 320-21.
230. Even when the declarant is unavailable, reliability may be missing. See
Morrison v. Bradley, - Colo. , 655 P.2d 385 (1982). Enterprising plaintiffs in
Morrison sued for wrongful death of their father. Even though the evidence was
undisputed that the deceased was earning a salary of $8,500 per year, the trial
court allowed the son to testify to the decedent's statements of intent to buy the
son a truck and to pay for his schooling as a heavy equipment operator. The
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ant remains available, the guarantee of reliability is much
diminished because the declarant has had an opportunity-and
23
likely a motive-to fabricate. '
To assert that the Hilimon doctrine should be limited to cases
in which the declarant is unavailable is not novel. Several courts
have apparently applied such a de facto requirement, or at least
23 2
have mentioned approvingly that the declarant is not available.
evidence shows what a crafty litigant can do with this exception. The intermediate appellate court rejected the evidence on a relevance rationale, but, incredibly, the Supreme Court of Colorado agreed with the trial court and held that the
father's out-of-court statement of intention to give his son financial support was
admissible. Id. at -, 655 P.2d at 387-88.
A relevance rationale for excluding a similar statement was rejected in State
v. McKenney, 459 A.2d 1093 (Me. 1983) (shoplifting prosecution). The defendant testified that she had intended to pay for a television set with $2,000 she had
on her person at the time of her arrest. Her brother, however, had said to a
store employee earlier that he had to leave the store to cash a check to pay for
the set. This statement of intention was offered to impeach the defendant's contention that she would pay for the set. Relevance was marginal at best, because
she was charged with taking a police band scanner, not the television set.
231. Professor Wigmore has collected three classes of reasons supporting
exceptions to the hearsay rule:
a. Where the circumstances are such that a sincere and accurate
statement would naturally be uttered, and no plan of falsification be
formed;
b. Where, even though a desire to falsify might present itself,
other considerations such as the danger of easy detection or the fear of
punishment would probably have been detected and corrected;
c. Where the statement was made under such conditions of publicity that an error, if it had occured, would probably have been detected and corrected.
J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1422, at 254. When the declarant remains available,
he may conveniently state his prior intention as anything that conforms to the
later course of events. Consequently, the circumstances do not support sincerity; no danger of detection is present; and no publicity surrounds the declaration
of intention. The residue supporting the exception is only the necessity created
by the unavailability of the declarant.
232. United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 379 (9th Cir. 1976) ("declarant should be dead or otherwise unavailable"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977);
People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 186, 148 P.2d 627, 631 (1944) ("dead or
otherwise unavailable"); State v. Sharbono, 175 Mont. 373, 385, 563 P.2d 61, 68
(1977) ("speaker is incapable of being present"); State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561,
585, 180 S.E.2d 755, 771 (1971) ("deceased persons"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874
(1973). See also Brown v. Tard, 552 F. Supp. 1341 (D.N.J. 1982) (murdered declarant "indisputably was 'unavailable' "); Long v. Asphalt Paving Co., 47 N.C.
App. 564, 268 S.E.2d 1 (1980) (declarant "deceased at the time of trial"). Cf
United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 910 (8th Cir. 1975) (deceased declarant
"unavailable"), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976). Two cases have stated that the
declarant need not be unavailable, but then refused to admit the declaration
because other evidence was available. See Redhead v. United States, 686 F.2d
178 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1190 (1983); United States v. Mandel,
437 F. Supp. 262 (D. Md. 1977), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 591 F.2d
1347 (4th Cir.), affd, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
961 (1980).
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Some commentators have advocated this same step. 2 33 A requirement of unavailability may even be mandated by the confronta2 34
tion clause.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Hilimon doctrine was created by misapplying earlier
holdings to fit a fact pattern so unique that it amounts to a sui
generis case. The judicial process has since expanded this initially
inelastic doctrine along several lines, the most objectionable of
which are use of the declaration to prove the action of another
person and the use of the declaration to prove an action in the
past. Despite conceptual problems, the doctrine has become so
firmly accepted as an exception to the hearsay rule that the drafters of all of the major rules systems have embraced it.235
The Hilimon doctrine, despite its fits and starts, appears to be
headed on the road toward ultimate elimination of the hearsay
rule. A less distant journey would be to allow into evidence any
declaration which appears reliable and which was made by an unavailable person. 23 6 Should the hearsay rule ultimately be swal233. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 38, § 295, at 848; Hutchins & Slesinger,
Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: State of Mind in Issue, 29 COLUM. L. REV.
147, 154 (1929). But see Hinton, supra note 42, at 415-17. Louisell and Mueller
suggest that a new exception be created under rule 804, which requires unavailability. See 4 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 3, § 442, at 581. Tribe
argues that the declarant should be unavailable because cross-examination will
be effective only after the events when a statement of future intention is involved. See Tribe, supra note 11, at 969-71.
234. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). In Roberts, the Court
reasoned as follows:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial,
the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more
in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
Id. (footnote omitted). Arguably a Hilimon statement falls within a "firmly
rooted hearsay exception." The above discussion has shown, however, that the
indicia of reliability are absent for an available declarant.
235. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee comment ("The rule of
[Hillmon] allowing evidence of intention as tending to prove the doing of the act
intended, is of course, left undisturbed.") For a collection of other evidence
rules relying on the Hillmon doctrine, see supra note 132.
236. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 65 (West 1974) ("[i]n any
action or other civil judicial proceeding, a declaration of a: deceased person shall
not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay. . . if the court finds that it was made
in good faith and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant"); MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE Rule 503(a) (1942) ("[e]vidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds that the declarant . . . is unavailable as a witness"); J. WIG-
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lowed, the judicial process will have accomplished the deed.
Since almost no one advocates abolition of the hearsay rule, however, the courts ought not to do indirectly that which they choose
not to do directly. Accordingly, the Hilimon doctrine, if it is not to
eradicate the hearsay rule entirely, should be narrowly construed
in those cases where it applies. Certainly one useful narrowing
would be to require unavailability of the declarant. Perhaps then
the hearsay rule and the Hilimon doctrine can lie side by side in
quiet waters.
supra note 3, § 1427, at 257 ("[t]he next and needed step in the
liberalization of the rule is the adoption of the general exception for all statements
MORE,

of deceasedpersons") (emphasis in original).
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